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Introduction
The recently released report of the First Principles Review of 
Defence, Creating One Defence, is set to reshape the Defence 
enterprise over the next few years. This ASPI special report 
explains the review’s recommendations and analyses the 
consequences for Defence.
Background
Consistent with its election promise, the Abbott government 
initiated the First Principles Review on 5 August 2014. The 
five-person review panel was chaired by David Peever (former 
Rio Tinto managing director) and included Peter Leahy 
(former Chief of Army), Jim McDowell (former BAE Systems 
executive), Robert Hill (Defence Minister in the Howard 
government) and Lindsay Tanner (Finance Minister in the 
Rudd government). The panel was assisted by the Boston 
Consulting Group and an in-house secretariat from Defence.
In announcing the review, the Defence Minister said that it 
would ‘make recommendations designed to ensure Defence’s 
business structures support the Australian Defence Force’s 
principal tasks out to 2030’. The review’s lengthy terms of 
reference are reproduced in Appendix A of this ASPI report. 
They’re a peculiar mix of the general and the specific. On 
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the one hand, the review was given a wide remit to look at 
Defence’s structure and business processes. On the other, it 
was tasked to report on a range of very specific issues, from 
the organisational arrangements for geospatial intelligence 
to improving cash-flow estimation for capital investment.
What’s the problem?
According to the review, there have been 35 significant 
reviews of Defence since the absorption of the three single 
services into the Department of Defence in 1973—and 
no fewer than 20 were undertaken between 2008 and 
2011. In many cases, the reviews were direct responses 
to specific events. For example, the 2011 Rizzo review of 
naval sustainment followed the unexpected collapse of the 
RAN’s amphibious lift capability just before a cyclone struck 
the coast of Queensland. Other reviews, such as the 2003 
Kinnaird review of defence procurement, reflected long-term 
dissatisfaction with performance in a core function. The First 
Principles Review falls into a third category: a comprehensive 
review of the entire enterprise, in the manner of the 1996 
Defence Efficiency Review, the 2006 Defence Management 
Review and the 2008 Defence Budget Audit.
There’s no point paraphrasing the problem that the First 
Principles Review sought to address, because Creating One 
Defence provides a concise and unflinching diagnosis:
The current organisational model and processes are 
complicated, slow and inefficient in an environment 
which requires simplicity, greater agility and timely 
delivery. Waste, inefficiency and rework are palpable.
Defence is suffering from a proliferation of structures, 
processes and systems with unclear accountabilities. 
These in turn cause institutionalised waste, 
delayed decisions, flawed execution, duplication, 
a change-resistant bureaucracy, over-escalation 
of issues for decision and low engagement levels 
amongst employees.
Going back to first principles
The review team ‘conducted an end-to-end holistic review 
based on the outcomes required of Defence and founded on 
the first principles agreed by the review team’. The outcome 
required of Defence was taken to be its Strategic Direction 
Statement from government:
Protect and advance Australia’s strategic interests 
through the provision of appropriately prepared and 
equipped armed forces. To achieve this, Defence prepares 
for and conducts military operations and other tasks as 
directed by the Government.
The seven ‘first principles’ agreed by the team were:
• Clear authorities and accountabilities that align with 
resources: decision-makers are empowered and held 
responsible for delivering on strategies and plans within 
agreed resourcing.
• Outcome orientation: delivering what is required with 
processes, systems and tools being the ‘means not 
the end’.
• Simplicity: eliminating complicated and unnecessary 
structures, processes, systems and tools.
• Focus on core business: Defence doing only for itself 
what no-one else can do more effectively and efficiently.
• Professionalism: committed people with the right skills 
in appropriate jobs.
• Timely, contestable advice: using internal and 
external expertise to provide the best advice so that 
the outcome is delivered in the most cost-effective and 
efficient manner.
• Transparency: honest and open behaviour which 
enables others to know exactly what Defence is doing 
and why.
Although it’s doubtful that the seven principles apply in 
every circumstance, and even less clear that they include 
everything to be desired of Defence, they’re a reasonable 
and uncontentious starting point. Certainly, a defence 
organisation that fully reflected the seven principles would 
be a good thing.
Notwithstanding the ‘first principles’ methodology, the 
review has also clearly been influenced by reforms to the UK 
Ministry of Defence following the 2011 Levene review.
The report
The review panel’s report, Creating One Defence (henceforth 
One Defence), was released by the Defence Minister on 
1 April 2015. ‘One Defence’ refers to the proposed end-state 
for Defence—‘a more unified and integrated organisation that 
is more consistently linked to its strategy and clearly led by 
its centre’. Presumably, One Defence (which appears in bold 
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text throughout the report) is intended as a catch-cry for use 
in the forthcoming implementation period.
In releasing the report, the Defence Minister said that the 
government had agreed, or agreed in principle, to 75 of its 
76 recommendations—the exception concerned the future 
of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO). 
Implementation will commence immediately, and most of the 
changes are planned to be completed within two years. The 
review panel, along with a yet-to-be-identified woman, will 
form an Oversight Board to monitor implementation, provide 
regular reports to the government, and assist Defence in 
making annual progress reports to the government.
One Defence runs to 78 pages exclusive of appendixes, so 
there’s roughly one recommendation per page. Although the 
report is fairly direct and to the point, a degree of familiarity 
with the Defence organisation is helpful in understanding its 
arguments and conclusions.
The review makes six key recommendations, which guide the 
structure of its report:
1. Establish a strong, strategic centre to strengthen 
accountability and top level decision-making.
2. Establish a single end-to-end capability development 
function within the Department to maximise the efficient, 
effective and professional delivery of military capability.
3. Fully implement an enterprise approach to the delivery 
of corporate and military enabling services to maximise 
their effectiveness and efficiency.
4. Ensure committed people with the right skills are in 
appropriate jobs to create the One Defence workforce.
5. Manage staff resources to deliver optimal use of funds and 
maximise efficiencies.
6. Commence implementation immediately with the 
changes required to deliver One Defence in place within 
two years.
The remainder of this ASPI special report is in three 
parts. Part 1 examines the overall consequences of the 
review’s recommendations for Defence’s structure, 
processes, workforce and efficiency. Part 2 provides 
our individual assessments on different aspects of the 
planned reforms. Part 3 comments on each the review’s 
specific recommendations.
Part 1: Consequences for Defence
The First Principles Review’s numerous recommendations 
make a concise summary difficult. Consequently, what 
follows is only the ‘big picture’ impact on Defence. A more 
detailed exploration and critical analysis of the proposed 
changes follows.
Structure—One Defence in two parts
The One Defence model divides the existing unitary 
organisation into two halves: a mostly civilian part reporting 
to the Secretary of the Defence Department, and a mostly 
military part reporting to the Chief of the Defence Force 
(CDF). The resulting structure is shown in Figure 1.
For comparison, the existing organisation structure is shown 
in Figure 2. The main changes, which are summarised in 
Table 1, are as follows:
• The new Associate Secretary Group subsumes the current 
Chief Operating Officer Group and its subsidiary parts.
• A new Policy and Intelligence Group will be formed by 
combining the current Strategy Group and most of the 
existing Intelligence and Security Group.
• The Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO), which is 
currently a quasi-independent prescribed agency, will 
be disbanded and a new Capability Acquisition and 
Sustainment Group will take its place within Defence.
• The Capability Development Group will be disbanded 
and most of its functions divided between the services 
and Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) Group, with 
some additional elements going to the new Capability 
Acquisition and Sustainment Group and Policy and 
Intelligence Group.
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Figure 1:  The One Defence structure
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Figure 2:  The existing Defence structure
Table 1:  The old and the new
Existing organisation ‘One Defence’ organisation
Chief Operating Officer Associate Secretary
Deputy Secretary Strategy  
Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence
Deputy Secretary Intelligence & Security
Defence Materiel Organisation Deputy Secretary Capability Acquisition and Sustainment
Chief of Capability Development Disbanded and divided between Navy, Army, Air Force, 
Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group, and Policy 
and Intelligence Group
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Table 2:  Group and service categories under One Defence
Direction setting 
and contestability
Defence 
capability: 
delivery
Defence 
capability:  
joint command
Enablers Control
Associate Secretary
Deputy Secretary Policy and 
Intelligence
Chief Finance Officer
Deputy Secretary Capability 
Acquisition and Sustainment
Chief Defence Scientist 
Vice Chief of the Defence Force
Chiefs of Navy, Army and Air Force
Joint Operations
 
Just as the existing organisation is divided into enabling 
functions and capability and output managers, each of the 
new high-level organisational units is allocated into one or 
more of five categories, as shown in Table 2. The delivery 
and joint command categories are self-explanatory. Enablers 
support the generation of capability, while direction setting 
and contestability perform headquarters functions. The Chief 
Finance Officer is in a category all his own—control.
A new One Defence business model will be introduced with 
three key features:
• a stronger and more strategic centre
• an end-to-end approach for capability development, 
with capability managers assigned clear authority and 
accountability
• enablers that are integrated and customer-centric.
Governance—a stronger and more strategic 
centre
The diarchy has been retained, and new list of joint and 
separate accountabilities for the Secretary and the CDF 
has been drafted (see Table 3). Ministerial directives along 
the same lines have been promulgated in the past. Key 
changes from the last publicly disclosed ministerial directive 
(circa 2007) are as follows:
• The Secretary and CDF are now separately responsible for 
managing their respective parts of the organisation.
• The design of the defence force is now the sole 
responsibility of the CDF; the Secretary is responsible 
for contesting specific capability investment options. 
Previously, the Secretary and CDF were jointly responsible 
for the ‘identification, development and provision of 
current and future capability’.
Responsibility for the department’s key processes is 
divided between the Associate Secretary and the VCDF, 
who together form a sort of junior diarchy that mirrors the 
division of accountabilities between the Secretary and CDF. 
The Associate Secretary will be responsible for enterprise 
planning, performance monitoring and risk management, 
and the VCDF will be responsible for force structure, 
preparedness and military strategy. The review envisages 
the Associate Secretary and VCDF as the ‘integrators for the 
Defence enterprise and the future force and joint capabilities 
respectively’. As the central authority for alignment, the 
Associate Secretary will ‘challenge’ the subsidiary plans put 
forward by the groups and services to ensure alignment with 
strategy and priorities.
A new Defence committee structure will be established, as 
set out in Figure 3, with memberships as listed in Table 4. The 
Defence Committee will focus ‘on the major capability and 
resource trade-offs and the shared accountabilities of the 
Secretary and CDF’. The Enterprise Business Committee will 
be responsible for running the Defence enterprise, including 
‘planning, performance monitoring and reporting, enterprise 
risk management, information management and service 
delivery reform’. The Investment Committee will consider 
the equipment and facilities investment programs along with 
individual projects.
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Table 3:  Accountabilities of the Secretary and the CDF
Shared accountabilities
• Provide integrated, timely policy and strategic advice to Government
• Set top level organisational goals and responsibilities, approve group and service plans and manage performance
• Manage and mitigate strategic and organisational risks 
Accountabilities of the Secretary Accountabilities of the CDF
• Coordinate the provision of timely advice to Government, 
including on Defence strategic missions, and the policy aspects of 
operational deployments
• Set and manage the Defence budget, ensuring Defence remains 
within the allocated budget
• Ensure that capability and capital investments options are 
appropriately contested for policy, financial and technical 
alignment
• Enable capability managers to deliver capability into service in 
accordance with plans agreed with Government
• Provide intelligence outputs including to whole of Government
• Set top level budgets and manage allocation of resources across 
Defence
• Provide enabling services to agreed service levels, including 
Defence science and research, human resources, information and 
communication technology, information management, facilities, 
estate, security and legal
• Manage the Defence organisation within your reporting line, 
including design, control and reform of structures, processes, 
and policies
• Ensure sound management of financial and other resources 
in accordance with the Public Governance, Performance and 
Accountability Act 2013
• Set workforce and employment framework for the public service
• Provide stewardship of the Australian Public Service workforce
• Command the Australian Defence Force
• Advise Government on the deployment of the Australian Defence 
Force to achieve Government objectives
• Propose force structures to meet Government objectives within 
the allocated resource envelope
• Deliver capability outcomes based on capability needs agreed 
with Government within budget and schedule
• Ensure preparedness of the force through development and 
sustainment of military capability consistent with Government 
requirements
• Manage the Defence organisation within your reporting line, 
including design, control and reform of structures and processes
• Set requirements for enabling functions that provide input to 
capability
• Manage within agreed budgets
• Set a workforce framework and conditions of service for the 
Australian Defence Force
• Provide stewardship of the military workforce
Source: First Principles Review, Creating One Defence.
Figure 3:  The One Defence higher defence committee system
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Table 4:  The One Defence senior committee structure
Defence Committee Enterprise Business Committee Investment Committee
Secretary (Chair) Associate Secretary (Chair) Vice Chief of the Defence Force (Chair)
Chief of the Defence Force Vice Chief of the Defence Force Associate Secretary
Associate Secretary Deputy Secretary Policy & Intelligence Deputy Secretary Policy & Intelligence
Vice Chief of the Defence Force Chief Finance Officer Chief Finance Officer
Deputy Secretary Policy & Intelligence Chiefs of Navy, Army and Air Force Chiefs of Navy, Army and Air Force
Chief Finance Officer Deputy Secretary Capability Acquisition and 
Sustainment
Deputy Secretary Capability Acquisition and 
Sustainment
 Heads of human resources, information and 
communication technology, facilities and 
estate
Finance Department representative
Note: The role of the Chief Defence Scientist on committees is yet to be made clear.
 
Other enterprise-wide committees will be reviewed with the 
aim of substantially reducing their number. It is noteworthy 
that the service chiefs are not members of the Defence 
Committee. In addition, legislative changes are planned to 
formally ‘recognise the authority of the CDF and VCDF’ and 
remove the statutory authority of the service chiefs.
Capability development—an end-to-end 
approach
The dissolution of the Capability Development Group will 
mean that requirements-setting will be transferred to the 
service chiefs (for land, sea and air proposals) and to the VCDF 
(for joint proposals). In addition, the current contestability 
function will go to the new Policy and Intelligence Group, 
along with responsibility for seeking project approval from 
government. The Australian Defence Test and Evaluation 
Office and the Project Management Office will move to the 
new Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group.
Investment proposals will be considered by the Investment 
Committee chaired by the VCDF. A new Defence Investment 
Plan will be created, which will include all ‘capital and related 
investments (such as materiel, estate and facilities, workforce 
and information and communications technology)’. In a 
new process for the initial entry of projects into the Defence 
Investment Plan—Gate Zero—the services will effectively bid 
to have new projects included.
Following entry into the investment program, capability 
managers will have ‘authority and accountability as 
sponsors for the delivery of capability outcomes to time and 
budget’. Simultaneously, the new Capability Acquisition 
and Sustainment Group will manage projects ‘from Gate 
Zero through to Final Operating Capability, including the 
integration of all Fundamental Inputs to Capability’. In 
doing so, the group will prepare proposals for first- and 
second-pass approval.
As proposals are brought forward in the Defence Investment 
Committee, the Policy and Intelligence Group will provide 
‘significantly enhanced and strengthened’ contestability of 
the proposals—including ‘red card’ decision rights—on the 
basis of ‘consistency with financial, technical and strategic 
guidance’. To support this, Defence’s core policy functions 
(apart from force structure policy) will be consolidated into 
one unit under the Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence.
Although the essential features of the existing two-pass 
process for capability development will be retained, the 
investment approval process will be revised for large and 
complex projects to ensure that a wide range of options are 
considered initially for each proposal, and well as to reduce 
unnecessary documentation at each stage.
Under the ‘smart buyer’ construct, the Capability Acquisition 
and Sustainment Group will make greater use of industry in 
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managing both sustainment and acquisition. The existing 
System Program Offices will be reviewed to determine the 
best procurement model in each instance, and outsourcing 
will occur where it offers best value for money. In a similar 
manner, DSTO will form closer partnerships with industry 
and academia.
Enabling services—an enterprise-wide 
approach
The review makes several recommendations to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of enabling services. As a first 
step, it says that all unnecessary estate holdings should be 
disposed of, beginning with 17 bases identified in the 2012 
Future Defence estate report. The review says that the net 
present value of the disposal is $1.4 billion over 30 years. 
Neither the Future Defence estate report nor the list of bases 
has been made public.
The Associate Secretary will be the ultimate authority for 
information management, and the VCDF will be the design 
authority for C4ISR (command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). 
Management information systems will be bolstered to 
provide better decision-making and military interoperability. 
Business and information processes will be standardised 
and ‘enterprise-wide frameworks for architecture standards 
and master data management’ will be established. The 
Chief Information Officer will have ‘red card’ decision rights 
to stop corporate or C4ISR projects that don’t comply 
with interoperability standards. All geospatial information 
functions will be consolidated into the Australian Geospatial 
Intelligence Organisation.
The shared service model of centralised support will be 
fully implemented across Defence, including in the new 
Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group. All corporate 
services (apart from finance) will be consolidated under the 
Associate Secretary.
Personnel—the right people in the right jobs
Several recommendations have been made with the goal of 
creating an appropriately skilled and cost-effective Defence 
workforce. As a first step, a strategic workforce plan will be 
developed for the civilians in enabling functions to guide 
recruitment, learning and development, performance and 
talent management. At the same time, the enabling and 
military corporate workforce will be reviewed to ensure 
‘the greatest overall economy, efficiency and effectiveness’. 
Where consistent with the maintenance of capability, 
military personnel in enabling and corporate functions 
will be replaced by public servants or the function will be 
outsourced if it is transactional.
The review found that Defence suffers from too many 
layers of management and anomalously narrow spans 
of management supervision. Accordingly, the number of 
organisational layers will be reduced and spans of control 
will be increased. Consistent with this, seven Band 3 (deputy 
secretary) positions will be cut, including six from DMO and 
DSTO. Finally, a new performance management system that 
‘rewards high performance and introduces consequences 
for underperformance and failure to deal with it’ will 
be introduced.
De-layering of the organisation, along with other changes, 
will result in workforce efficiencies. Around 1,000 fewer 
civilians and 950 fewer military personnel will be required in 
the new Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group, and 
around 650 fewer civilians and 100 fewer military personnel 
will be required elsewhere in Defence.
Implementation
The review has provided an implementation plan and 
governance structure to guide the forthcoming reforms. 
It’s planned that the bulk of changes will be complete 
within two years. The review team will stay on (augmented 
by a new female member) to provide external assurance. 
Regular reports will be made to the Defence Minister, and the 
government will receive yearly progress reports.
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Part 2: Three perspectives on the 
forthcoming reforms
Peter Jennings: One Defence—root causes, 
risks and values
Smiling faces beam from the cover of One Defence. These 
happy folks, who are balanced for gender and service, are 
pleased that Defence business processes have had their 
36th substantive review since 1973. They may agree with 
the report that there are ‘low engagement levels amongst 
employees’, that they are ‘inward looking, complicated and 
difficult to manage’, that they are ‘risk averse and resistant 
to change’, and that they are ‘subsumed by box-ticking 
and process tinkering’ and badly in need of ‘changes to 
behavioural mindsets’. If so, One Defence is the answer to 
their problems, for it’s nothing less than an ‘end-to-end 
holistic review’ and a ‘total systems approach based on 
evidence and analysis’.
It’s important to look beyond the business-speak of One 
Defence, because David Peever and his colleagues on the 
review team are correct in their diagnosis of Defence’s 
management problems. Their critique is all the more 
stinging because of its accuracy. If implemented, the 
70 recommendations in the report will modernise the 
organisation. A small number of recommendations should 
have been taken further and a few left out altogether but, as 
reviews go, One Defence is sensible, serious and purposeful. It 
needs to be studied closely.
Root causes—here to stay
The reviewers ‘were puzzled as to why Defence has been 
unable to reform itself’ and identified three ‘root causes’ that 
have created ‘complacency and inertia’:
• ‘The high operational tempo and increasing national 
security demands over the past decade have demanded 
high levels of the senior leadership’s time and attention;
• Budget uncertainty with $18.2 billion removed from the 
Defence budget from 2009–10 onwards which has led 
to reactive planning, deferred military capability and a 
hollowing out of enablers … and
• Leadership churn from 1998 to the present resulting in 
nine ministers with an average tenure of two years, six 
Secretaries with an average tenure of two and a half years 
and five Chiefs of the Defence Force with an average 
tenure of four years.’
Defence might take some comfort from this diagnosis 
because none of those factors is the organisation’s doing. A 
high operational tempo is the result of worsening strategic 
circumstances. The fact that the operational record since 
1998 has been exemplary surely says something worthwhile 
about Defence’s management skills. Australians love to 
indulge in the ‘lions led by donkeys’ myth, but operational 
success is based on good military and civilian leadership 
as well as good fighting forces. Looking forward, a savvy 
reading of our strategic outlook would judge that Defence’s 
operational tempo will remain high. Senior military leaders 
and our politicians will continue to be absorbed by military 
operations. So this root cause of ‘complacency and inertia’ 
will remain, but let’s remember that Defence is there 
for the purpose of doing military operations—it’s not a 
planned diversion.
On the second root cause—budget uncertainty—Peever’s 
team is 100% correct. Strip mining $18.2 billion in a couple of 
years after 2009 essentially destroyed Defence’s capacity to 
implement the Strategic Reform Program—the implementing 
plan for the 2008 Pappas review, which was the last big 
externally led review of Defence until this one. The spending 
plans of defence white papers since 1976 were all rapidly 
undercut by government-directed budget rethinks. The 2000 
White Paper is partially exempted from that generalisation 
because, while it underestimated key program costs, the 
document also committed to a 10-year spending plan that 
was exceeded by a government riding high on the minerals 
boom. The global financial crisis put an end to such largesse, 
but while the government cut funds there was no change to 
the grandiose force structure plans set out in 2009 and 2013.
The message for government is clear: if you want Defence 
to manage itself better, you need to stick to deliverable and 
long-term spending plans. Those two requirements call for 
a large measure of political bipartisanship and a willingness 
to not overpromise. It would be naive to think that Defence is 
out of the woods about its future financial stability. Broader 
economic pressures on government are growing, and the 
central money agencies in Canberra are circling because 
that’s what white pointers do. So Peever’s second ‘root cause’ 
won’t go away either.
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It would be nice to think that leadership churn will go away, 
but One Defence’s third root cause is probably a permanent 
feature of our political system and the way it intersects with 
the Australian Public Service. Thirty-six month terms in office 
mean that governments are never far from campaign mode, 
so ministerial longevity is a rare thing. The tenure of Defence 
Department secretaries and CDFs is the gift of governments. 
It’s obvious from the shorter tenure of secretaries that 
governments are happier to tinker with those positions 
than with CDFs. Of the previous six secretaries before 
Dennis Richardson, four left the job in publicly unhappy 
circumstances. The report doesn’t dwell on the point, but 
an obvious lesson for any government is that it needs to 
get its relationship with secretaries right—and not just in 
Defence. Leadership churn is a feature of modern public life, 
and no-one should imagine that One Defence will make that 
phenomenon go away.
Risks and red cards
This ASPI special report looks in detail at each of the review’s 
70 recommendations, assessing the value and achievability of 
each. In aggregate, our shared view is that One Defence offers 
a sensible reform program for Defence, although uncertainty 
about details of implementation remains. If implemented 
carefully, with a willingness to sensibly modify approaches as 
the plan unfolds, One Defence will produce a more effective 
organisation. But there are clear risks, too. Three stand out as 
being most threatening to the project.
First, the wholesale redesign of DMO and Capability 
Development Group will take place at the same time as 
Defence has to develop recommendations for government 
on the Future Submarine, the Anzac frigate replacement 
and a slew of significant projects that will be the core of the 
2015 Defence White Paper. A failure to proceed in a timely 
fashion with these projects will create capability gaps, 
produce budget underspends and risk the sustainability of 
key industry partners. As a rule, one wouldn’t advise trialling 
a new capability development and acquisition process on the 
largest and most complex defence projects ever.
Second, the report emphasises clarifying individual 
responsibilities of key decision-makers, but does so at the 
expense of acknowledging that the whole system must 
work together to deliver outcomes. A number of players 
are explicitly handed ‘red card’ powers that enable them 
to stop projects dead if their particular areas of concern 
aren’t addressed: the VCDF, the Deputy Secretary Policy and 
Intelligence, the Chief Information Officer. On a worst-case 
reading, that’s a recipe for deadlock. The only way the 
machine will tick over is if people bring cooperative mindsets 
to the business.
Third, One Defence takes a similarly uncollegial approach 
to structuring the diarchy between the CDF and the 
Secretary. As important as it is to clearly state their separate 
responsibilities, the success or failure of the diarchy depends 
on how the two principals work together, rather than what 
they control separately. The diarchy won’t function properly 
if the Secretary and the CDF attempt to separate their roles. 
At best, that would produce a stalemate between the two 
positions, with starchy correspondence exchanged between 
the two offices. Perhaps that should lead to an additional 
accountability—let’s call this a ‘prime directive’: the Secretary 
and the CDF must at all costs work together, collegially, as a 
team. If the need for collegiality is overlooked at the expense 
of defining separate domains, the risk is that the One Defence 
form of diarchy will enshrine two kingdoms in one realm—a 
dangerous path in a Game of Thrones.
Values—the key missing ingredient
The only mention of values in One Defence is a passing 
reference on the very last page of the report:
Underlying these changes though is the need for a 
behavioural shift in order to give true effect to the One 
Defence system. Behavioural elements include ‘the 
attitudes, belief systems and core values that drive 
behaviour and guide daily activities and decision-making 
throughout the institution’.
Never was an afterthought so true. The reality is that Defence 
can work effectively, produce good equipment solutions, 
offer good policy advice, fight and win wars, and in fact 
do everything government needs of it using any number 
of senior leadership organisational structures. Far more 
important than the organisational design is the way people 
behave towards each other when they come to work. And, 
ultimately, behaviour is shaped by values.
Although this suggestion will set eyes rolling and heads 
shaking, Defence needs to have a new internal discussion 
about the values its people should hold. Organisations that 
tolerate bad values—behaviours like bullying, failure to 
delegate authority, risk aversion and disrespectful treatment 
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of staff—will fail to deliver high performance no matter what 
their organisational structure. The 2014 State of the Service 
Report on the Australian Public Service suggests that these 
are widespread problems. Defence will not be immune 
to these challenges. As a key measure to implement One 
Defence, the organisation should start an internal discussion 
about how to encourage the right values and behaviours, 
from senior leaders to the most junior staff. This will create 
the most constructive context for implementing change.
Andrew Davies: The capability development 
life cycle
The First Principles Review has recommended the formation 
of ‘a single and end-to-end capability development 
function’. Two casualties of this approach are the Capability 
Development Group (CDG) and DMO.
CDG was formerly responsible for the capability development 
process from project inception through to second-pass 
approval, after which responsibility would pass to DMO 
for project management and delivery. The Capability 
Acquisition and Sustainment Group will subsume most of the 
responsibilities of CDG (but few of the staff currently doing 
the work) and all of the responsibilities of DMO. Critically, 
however, the services and the VCDF will take responsibility 
for identifying capability requirements and sponsoring 
them through the approval and acquisition phases. CDG’s 
contestability and internal costing functions will transfer to 
the Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence and the Chief 
Finance Officer, respectively.
Force structuring and capability definition
The First Principles Review institutionalises an annual 
force structure review—an activity that’s traditionally been 
confined to the development of a Defence White Paper. Given 
the time it takes to develop and implement force structures—
the capability initiatives from the Defence 2000 White Paper 
are still not completely delivered—it’s not clear that an 
annual review will repay the effort needed to do it properly.
Once the ‘big picture’ force structure is decided, individual 
capability proposals from the capability managers will now 
face a ‘Gate Zero’ in the capability development process—a 
‘new, formalised point in the approval process where a 
concept is given approval to progress for development and 
potential consideration at first pass’. That’s a potentially 
valuable step, albeit one that could add even more time 
to an already lengthy process. Previously, much attention 
was given to capability proposals at first and second 
pass, but relatively little scrutiny was applied to the initial 
entry into the process. The combination of organisational 
inertia and the raised expectations of industry made the 
Defence Capability Plan fill up with proposals that might 
seem reasonable enough in isolation, but didn’t work at a 
portfolio level.
Given that the capability managers will shoulder 
responsibility for Gate Zero, but the Capability Acquisition 
and Sustainment Group will prepare the business cases 
for first- and second-pass approvals, the new process has 
removed the ‘artificial handover point’ that previously arose 
between CDG and DMO after second pass. Different parts 
of the organisation will still take the lead before and after 
Gate Zero approval, but it’s a much softer handover in the 
sense that it’s now—as intended—an ‘end-to-end capability 
development function’ from approved needs identification 
through to delivery. That’s a good thing, and the review 
can take credit for removing a major artificiality from the 
capability development process.
But there are a couple of things that will need watching. 
First, there’s still an opportunity for the services to game the 
system by specifying needs narrowly and thereby steering the 
outcome several steps down the line. Effective contestability 
at Gate Zero will be important. Second, a substantial fraction 
of the staff resources of the former CDG will still be required 
after Gate Zero, but those resources appear to return to 
the services. The implementation plan will have to address 
the staffing requirements of the Capability Acquisition and 
Sustainment Group.
Under the new process, the VCDF will be responsible for 
coordinating and integrating overall requirements through 
the Investment Committee—he’ll be the gatekeeper of the 
capital investment program. Presumably, any ‘big picture’ 
force structure changes suggested by the annual force 
structure review will be the responsibility of the VCDF as 
coordinator. At the same time, the Deputy Secretary Policy 
and Intelligence and the Chief Finance Officer will contest the 
business cases brought forward by the capability managers.
The VCDF will also be the capability manager for joint 
capabilities. By itself, that’s a good thing (and something 
I’ve previously argued for) because the ‘joining up’ of ADF 
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capabilities hasn’t had a champion on the same footing 
as single service capabilities. But the VCDF has a conflict 
of interest if he’s to act as both gatekeeper of the capital 
program and champion of joint capabilities. It would be 
better to either make the Deputy Secretary Policy and 
Intelligence the gatekeeper (in the way that the Deputy 
Secretary Strategy and Intelligence managed the capability 
program in the 1990s) or make the Chief Joint Operations 
the proposer for joint capabilities, if not the Joint Capability 
Manager (as the UK has done).
Contestability
The ‘arm’s length contestability’ sought by the review 
looks more than a little like the old Force Development and 
Analysis (FDA) division in the post-Tange review organisation. 
Tange deliberately built ‘creative tension’ into the capability 
development process, intending to ensure that only 
well-developed and defensible proposals went forward for 
government consideration. A degree of rancour was the 
result—when strongly held views reflecting a robust service 
culture are second-guessed by an ‘outgroup’, hard feelings 
are inevitable.
The trick to making contestability work properly is to 
develop as much collegiality as possible while maintaining 
independence of views and developing the required skills 
and professionalism. The old FDA was too removed from 
the service side of capability development, which often led 
to unnecessary and avoidable ill-will. But it was replaced 
by CDG’s internal contestability, which was insufficiently at 
arm’s length. The result was a poorly disciplined and heavily 
oversubscribed Defence Capability Plan. However, over the 
past decade, CDG has done some good work developing 
the required skills within its workforce. This has at least 
partly overcome the problems that result from a posting into 
capability development being only a brief part of a military 
career. Increasingly, capability development has come to be 
seen as part of the professional skill set required of officers in 
particular career streams. That approach needs to be kept.
Reconstituting a high-performing contestability mechanism 
won’t be easy. At the height of its effectiveness, FDA was 
supported by a large quantitative analysis organisation that 
performed operations research and mathematical modelling 
in support of force structure deliberations. By the mid-1990s, 
when relations between FDA and the services reached their 
lowest point, expertise in the required highly specialised 
analytical techniques had grown thin, and the value-add of 
FDA had fallen commensurately.
The implementation of the review will have to take into 
account the scarcity of the required expertise and allow 
time for it to mature. Ross Babbage, who ran the Force 
Development branch of FDA in the 1980s, is cautiously 
optimistic that it can be done, but adds that it isn’t possible 
by relying on Defence’s internal resources. His preferred 
approach would be to:
• assemble some of the best analytical brains in the ADF 
and the public service (DSTO has some people with 
appropriate skills and experience)
• contract in, either full or part time, some of the ‘old hands’ 
who are still capable of this work and prepared to help 
kickstart the initiative
• engage some high-calibre personnel from the US and UK 
for the first few years
• restart the active program of fostering and training a 
new generation of young Turks in Defence to be skilled 
in this work and, for some, to make it the backbone of 
their careers.
As well, and consistent with what the review envisages, it 
should be possible to supplement in-house analytical work 
with outsourced activities by organisations such as the 
RAND Corporation and other specialist consultancies, as 
has been done in support of submarine and shipbuilding 
project planning.
But it’ll be important not to sit the ‘contesters’ in one 
place and the service developers of capability needs in 
another—conflict would result. And scattering the capability 
developers to the four winds would impede coordination, 
training, mentoring and career development. The system will 
work best if those responsible for contesting business cases 
work closely with those responsible for developing them.
The aim, ultimately, has to be a set of options for government 
with accurate costings and the pros and cons of each 
clearly set out. Contestability will be working if the service’s 
preferred option (there’ll usually be one) is on the same 
rigorous footing as the others.
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Acquisition
The abolition of DMO is predicated on removing unnecessary 
layers of management, rationalising the workforce more 
generally, streamlining processes, and eliminating the 
tension between Defence and DMO. The aim is to produce a 
‘smart procurement’ model that operates more effectively 
than DMO has been able to.
Given that much organisational energy was being expended 
in unproductive ‘turf wars’ between Defence proper and 
DMO, the reabsorption was inevitable and is probably 
justified. However, there was undeniably merit in a more 
arm’s length relationship, and care will be needed to keep the 
benefits. In particular, the Kinnaird and (especially) Mortimer 
reviews wanted strong independent risk analysis of projects. 
That happened at various times, but always came with a cost 
to relationships within the department.
In that context, it’s worth noting that DMO’s independence 
was potentially most effective when there was a minister 
with responsibility for defence acquisition who could be 
advised by the CEO of DMO. In practice, that introduced 
another potential tension, this time between the two senior 
defence ministers, with one being advised by the Secretary 
and CDF and the other by DMO. So pulling DMO back into 
the department probably doesn’t come at much cost to the 
contestability of advice to government in practice.
Structurally, removing layers of management in acquisition 
and streamlining the workforce while reducing process 
are good ideas in principle but, as with other elements of 
the restructuring about to happen, much will be depend 
on the details of implementation. There are several major 
potential downsides in a substantial cut in the levels and 
numbers of people working in acquisition. First, cutting the 
number of high-level (and thus highly paid) positions risks 
losing the skills needed to manage smart procurement and 
sustainment. Large corporations don’t pay public service 
salaries to executives charged with managing big projects 
or operations.
Second, moving to a smaller organisation overall is fine, but 
it needs to be a smarter organisation with the right skills. 
One of the aims of placing DMO at arm’s length from the 
department in the first place was to allow it to recruit staff 
with the appropriate experience and professional skills 
and pay them commercially competitive salaries. For the 
most part, the commercial salaries didn’t happen, mostly 
because of the tensions with the department proper. But 
DMO did manage to raise the average level of qualifications in 
project management and engineering. That’ll be even more 
important with a smaller workforce, and it mightn’t come 
cheap. The alternative is outsourcing project management, 
but that’s likely to cost more still. As well, the interests of the 
government have to be protected in any outsourcing.
That’s also true in the redesign of acquisition and 
sustainment management processes. Of course reducing 
pointless process makes sense, and would no doubt make 
defence industry happy—frustration with DMO process is 
a common theme when speaking with industry—but part 
of DMO’s role is regulatory, and that has to be protected. 
As a monopsony buyer of many goods and services, the 
Commonwealth is a special type of customer and standard 
commercial practices don’t always apply.
Capability management and sustainment
One of the outstanding problems in Defence since the 
Kinnaird and Mortimer reforms were brought in has been 
a mismatch between the responsibilities of the capability 
managers and the resources they control. Under the system 
that emerged following those reviews, they have the 
responsibility to ‘raise, train and sustain’ force and capability 
elements for their respective domains, but don’t have direct 
management responsibility for the resources needed to 
do so. Instead, DMO manages sustainment on behalf of the 
capability managers, in arrangements formalised in materiel 
sustainment agreements.
In practice, it meant that everyone and no-one was 
responsible for serious failures. The then Secretary and 
CDF said as much when responding to the Defence Minister 
after a collapse of the Navy’s amphibious capability (which 
resulted in the 2011 Rizzo report). And the underperformance 
of the Collins class sustainment over many years had 
many owners—but none who was ever held to account. 
Addressing these issues isn’t a theoretical exercise in 
organisational arrangements.
The First Principles Review proposes several changes to 
the arrangements for capability management, but doesn’t 
seem to fix the core problem of diffuse accountability. The 
civilian–military division of responsibility remains much the 
same—only the names have been changed. At the highest 
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level, the Secretary has the responsibility of enabling 
‘capability managers to deliver capability into service in 
accordance with plans agreed with Government’ while the 
CDF will ‘Deliver capability outcomes based on capability 
needs agreed with Government within budget and schedule’ 
and ‘ensure preparedness of the force through development 
and sustainment of military capability consistent with 
Government requirements’.
At the next level down, the capability managers will ‘specify 
the Fundamental Inputs to Capability requirements, with 
the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group having 
responsibility for developing and delivering an integrated 
project plan.’ The implementation plan for the review needs 
to make this arrangement clear—as it stands, the review is 
confusing (or perhaps confused) about who has responsibility 
for projects and the integration of the fundamental inputs to 
capability (training, logistics and so on). Is it the services or 
the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group? As near as 
I can tell, sustainment will still depend on something closely 
resembling the materiel sustainment agreements which will 
now be between renamed parties but with still-to-be-defined 
accountability. It’s hard to see what’s been gained there.
Mark Thomson: One Defence in two parts
Confronted with the First Principles Review’s 70 detailed 
recommendations, it’s easy to lose sight of the forest for the 
trees. Viewed clear of the details, the two most important 
outcomes are the decisions—one explicit, one implicit—to 
leave things as they are: to retain the civilian–military diarchy, 
and to preserve the shared services model for materiel and 
corporate support.
These outcomes were not pre-ordained. There are some who 
would like to see the diarchy done away with and the CDF 
put in charge—either with or without a parallel civilian-led 
Defence Department. And there are others who would like 
to see the services reabsorb the materiel sustainment and 
enabling support functions. In each case, the arguments 
hinge on clarity of accountability and its alignment with 
authority. A typical rhetorical question would be: How can 
a service chief, or indeed the CDF, be held to account for 
delivering capability if they don’t control the resources 
needed for the task?
Although the first principle of the First Principles Review 
was ‘clear authorities and accountabilities that align with 
resources’, the review team members weren’t persuaded—
most likely because they recognised the need to balance 
accountability with other competing factors. For the shared 
services model, it was the substantial efficiencies available 
through economies of scale and the central rationing of 
service levels. For the diarchy, it was avoiding the conflict of 
interest that would arise if the military were the government’s 
sole source of advice about the military. I think the review 
made the right decision in both cases.
One Defence
Having decided to retain the diarchy and shared services 
model, the review was left with the task of building an 
improved business model incorporating those two features. 
Its solution is interesting and in some ways unexpected.
The first step is to split the department into two parts—one 
part reporting to the Secretary and the other reporting to the 
CDF. At the same time, the joint and separate accountabilities 
of the Secretary and CDF have been revised to reduce the 
number of joint roles (from 6 to 3) and increase the number 
of separate roles (from 15 to 21). As a result, the operation of 
the diarchy has shifted emphasis from joint administration 
to dual administration. Most importantly, the previously 
joint responsibility for the ‘identification, development and 
provision of current and future capability’ has been replaced 
by the sole accountabilities of the CDF to ‘propose force 
structures’ and ‘deliver capability outcomes’.
While it looks as though the Secretary has been handed an 
apron and told to get on with the corporate housekeeping, 
that’s not really what’s going on. To start with, the Secretary 
retains accountability for advising the government on 
‘Defence strategic missions, and the policy aspects of 
operational deployments’. More importantly, he’s also been 
tasked to ‘ensure that capability and capital investments 
options are appropriately contested for policy, financial and 
technical alignment’. And contestability isn’t restricted to the 
development of the future force: the Associate Secretary will 
‘challenge’ the annual plans put forward by the groups and 
services to ensure that they align with strategy and priorities.
In some ways, it’s an elegant solution. The Secretary will 
manage the overall budget and ensure that shared services 
(including procurement, sustainment and corporate support) 
are delivered so that the CDF can focus on generating 
military capability. At the same time, the civilian side of the 
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department will provide contestability of the military’s short- 
and long-term plans. So, does the new model add up?
One plus one equals …
Having divided the department into two, the question is 
whether it will be greater or less than the sum of its parts.
There’s always been some parallelism in Defence 
administration—the nature of military command and 
the strictures of the Public Service Act and the Financial 
Management and Accountability Act guaranteed it—but 
the new model entrenches and widens the civilian–military 
divide in Defence. This in itself is a concern, because it sends 
the wrong message to staff; Defence will always perform 
better when there’s close and continuous cooperation across 
the enterprise, unhindered by artificial divides.
But perhaps the division into two parts can be justified on the 
grounds that it clarifies accountabilities? I’m doubtful. Many 
of the accountabilities split between the civilian and military 
sides of the Defence are indivisible in practice.
Consider the management of enabling services. The 
Secretary is accountable for the provision of enabling 
services (and the setting of their budget), whereas the 
CDF is responsible for setting performance requirements 
for enabling functions. But budgeting and performance 
requirements are two sides of the same coin—one can’t be 
set without reference to the other. So who has primacy? Does 
the CDF trim his performance requirements to fit within the 
budget allocated by the Secretary, or does the Secretary 
allocate whatever resources are needed to fulfil the CDF’s 
requirements (robbing Peter to pay Paul)? Exactly the same 
problem arises with the division of accountabilities for 
capability development.
So what’s the alternative? Although the review aspires to 
build a ‘strong strategic centre’, it has in fact produced two 
strategic centres—one centred on the Associate Secretary 
and another on the VCDF. The alternative would be to build 
an integrated headquarters with the analytical capacity to 
make informed trade-offs between capability outcomes and 
internal resource allocations, with the Secretary and CDF 
jointly accountable for its process and outcomes.
One minus one equals …
For all the reasons cited in the review, the reinstatement of 
contestability into Defence is long overdue. But the devil is 
in the detail, and there are several aspects of the proposed 
contestability regime that deserve close scrutiny.
First, although the goal is to have a ‘continuous contestability 
function that operates throughout the capability 
development life cycle from concept to disposal’, the 
emphasis is clearly on the investment program and in 
particular on the approval of capability proposals. If the 
Associate Secretary’s ‘challenge’ of annual plans affecting 
in-service capability is to be effective, a substantial 
investment will be needed to build the necessary analytical 
capacity. The planned enhancement of management 
information systems is a necessary but not sufficient step.
Second, advice on the commercial and industry aspects of 
capability acquisitions is conspicuous by its absence from 
the new scheme—perhaps because this was one of the many 
points of contention between DMO and the Defence centre. 
Whatever the reason, it would be a pity to lose the baby with 
the bathwater.
Third, the proposed ‘red card’ decision rights accorded 
to the Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence are 
problematic. It makes no sense to give them (or indeed the 
Chief Information Officer) a veto over the decision rights of 
the VCDF as chair of the Investment Committee on what is 
ultimately the prerogative of the Secretary and CDF. A more 
workable approach would be to give the Deputy Secretary 
Policy and Intelligence the right to be heard when a project 
comes before the Defence Committee for final sign-off. 
Contestability shouldn’t be about vetoes, but about ensuring 
that decision-makers receive credible advice from more than 
one source.
Accountability
The shared services model unavoidably separates capability 
managers from the direct control of the resources needed 
to deliver the outcomes that they’re accountable for. But, in 
contrast to the concerns expressed by Andrew Davies in the 
previous section, I think that the problem is often overstated.
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In the most critical area—materiel sustainment—the service 
chiefs already hold the purse strings and are able to make 
trade-offs between cost and the level of support they receive. 
And their ability to do so has been enhanced in recent years 
through cooperation with industry facilitated by DMO. In 
terms of garrison and corporate support, the capability 
managers do not hold the budget, and service levels are 
largely set centrally. But this is no different from what 
happens in many parts of the private and public sectors. The 
essential point is that the shared services model (even in its 
current form) doesn’t prevent capability managers being 
held to account for their performance. With the improved 
monitoring and performance management of the groups and 
services under the One Defence model, the situation can only 
get better.
When it comes to capability development, the review 
envisages ‘Capability Managers having clear authority and 
accountability as sponsors for the delivery of capability 
outcomes to time and budget’. This is fanciful. The acquisition 
phase of capability development will be executed by the 
new Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group as the 
agent for the capability managers. It’s neither feasible nor 
practical for the capability managers to monitor and closely 
supervise the details of contracting, tender evaluation and 
project management. Conversely, the Capability Acquisition 
and Sustainment Group doesn’t control the level of risk that 
they’re directed to bear by the VCDF and services via the 
choice of equipment solutions. Capability development is a 
department-wide activity in which accountability rests with 
the diarchy and ultimately the minister.
Over the years, a great deal of attention has been placed on 
Defence’s structure and governance in an effort to ‘improve 
accountability’. One Defence continues the great quest. In 
the final analysis, however, accountability is something 
that one person imposes on another. And while structures 
and governance can facilitate or impede accountability, the 
real problem in Defence has been a systemic unwillingness 
to manage underperformance—from the top down. 
Consequently, the emergence of greater accountability 
will depend much more on cultural change within the 
organisational than on the intricacies of wiring diagrams. 
Prospects
Over the past decade, we’ve been promised a veritable 
cornucopia of improvements from Defence. Just about 
every aspect of the enterprise—governance, accountability, 
reporting, planning, efficiency—has been slated for 
enhancement, improvement or ‘being made more strategic’, 
yet here we are again.
The First Principles Review cites three ‘root causes’ for why 
Defence has been unable to reform itself in recent times: 
funding volatility, operational demands and leadership 
churn. There’s no denying that those have all been important 
factors, but I think that there’s more to be said about the 
seemingly endless cycle of Defence reform.
Let’s start with the acquisition function. Problems with 
major Defence projects periodically give rise to reviews 
followed by reforms. But there’s only so much that can be 
done to mitigate the inherent risk in acquiring cutting-edge 
weapons systems. With a large portfolio containing many 
risky projects, problems are inevitable. And when things do 
go wrong, Defence (or its acquisition agency) is blamed and 
the search for a solution begins anew. Unless the government 
is willing to always buy proven equipment off the shelf, or 
accept the risks that it signs up to, we’re doomed to repeat 
the cycle of reviews and reforms.
In terms of the overall structure and processes of the Defence 
enterprise, cyclical reform arises because nobody knows how 
to tame the beast. I have a bookshelf filled with reviews of 
Defence, from Tange’s 1973 report onwards. Each claims to 
have diagnosed the problem correctly, and each proposes 
a remedy with equal confidence. None has stood the test of 
time. Instead, incremental progress has been made by trying 
new ideas, retaining what works and rejecting what doesn’t. 
The quasi-independent DMO is an example of an idea that’s 
been tried and rejected.
As a result, the long-term progress of Defence reform owes as 
much to trial and error as it does to intelligent design. That’s 
arguably the lens through which the current round of reforms 
should be viewed. It’s one more opportunity to discard failed 
ideas and try some new ones. On past experience, the net 
result will be positive.
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Part 3: The recommendations in detail
In addition to its six key recommendations, the 
First Principles Review made a further 70 specific 
recommendations, which are examined below.
Key Recommendation 1: Establish a strong, strategic 
centre to strengthen accountability and top level 
decision-making.
Recommendation 1.1: This review be adopted as the road 
map for Defence reform for the next five years.
The 2009 Defence White Paper also made the case for 
five-year reviews:
… the Government intends to prepare a new Defence 
White Paper at intervals no greater than five years. 
This quinquennial White Paper development process 
will be the centrepiece of the Government’s new 
strategic risk-based approach to defence planning. 
(Paragraph 3.24)
Of course, the plan didn’t survive even one five-year period, 
as the subsequent white paper was brought forward to 2013. 
For One Defence to be adopted as a five-year road map, the 
plan would have to survive two federal elections and last 
beyond the likely incumbency of all current senior players. A 
more realistic outcome is that the review will have a clear run 
at least to the next federal election. After that point, changes 
of personalities and of necessity will see One Defence morph 
into new shapes.
Recommendation 1.2: A new One Defence business model.
At the heart of the proposed changes is a new business 
model. One Defence provides two diagrams: one for the 
existing business model and one for the proposed One 
Defence business model.
Peter Jennings says: With the then Vice Chief of Defence, 
David Hurley, I was responsible around 2010 for developing 
what was described as the Simplified Defence Business 
Model, illustrated on page 17 of One Defence. This was part 
of the implementing work for the Strategic Reform Program 
and replaced an even more elaborate model known rather 
caustically as the ‘Taubman’s paint chart’. Business models 
provide a visual description of how an organisation works by 
describing the entity’s purposes, the ways of achieving them 
and key internal relationships.
The Simplified Defence Business Model certainly had its 
flaws, but it had been debated at some length by the Defence 
Committee and for that reason was broadly accepted. A 
new organisational structure needs a new business model, 
which One Defence offers on page 18. The model’s only real 
weakness is that it hasn’t been produced by the current 
leadership team—it’s an injection from Peever’s review. If you 
haven’t been on the journey, the risk is that that the model 
looks more like an aggregation of boxes and arrows. Getting 
the Defence senior leadership group to ‘own’ the model is an 
essential task.
Recommendation 1.3: The diarchy is retained.
Recommendation 1.4: The individual and shared 
accountabilities of the Secretary and the Chief of the 
Defence Force be clarified, formally documented and 
promulgated through the organisation.
Although the review recommends that the diarchy be 
retained, it sets out a starker division of roles than has 
previously been the case. As a result, shared accountabilities 
are reduced to a mere three high-level matters. In effect, 
the administration of the department has been divided 
into two. The CDF has accountability for all things to do 
with the military (including the critical role of proposing 
force structures to the government), while the Secretary 
is responsible for finance, enabling services and some 
policy matters.
The problem is that many of the accountabilities allocated 
to either the Secretary or the CDF are interdependent. For 
example, the Secretary is responsible for the overall Defence 
budget, while the CDF is responsible for components of the 
budget. Does that mean that the CDF is accountable to the 
Secretary on budget matters? If not, how can the Secretary 
be accountable for managing the budget when he has no 
control over the CDF’s component? There are good reasons 
why shared accountability has been the backbone of the 
diarchy for more than four decades.
As important as it is to clearly state the separate 
responsibilities of the Secretary and the CDF, the success of 
the diarchy is built on how the two principals work together, 
rather than what they control separately. This is much harder 
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to put into a list of accountabilities but it reflects an essential 
reality of the two positions. The diarchy won’t function 
properly if the Secretary and the CDF attempt to separate 
their roles. At best, that would produce a stalemate between 
the two positions.
Recommendation 1.5: A streamlined top level management 
structure for the Department that is aligned with the One 
Defence business model.
The division of accountabilities between the Secretary and 
the CDF extends to the organisation as a whole.
In the interests of clarity, One Defence tries hard to separate 
the roles of civilian ‘direct reports’ to the Secretary and 
military ‘direct reports’ to the CDF, as shown in Figure 1. It’s 
harder to document the reality of life at the top of Defence. 
In the real Defence world, these direct reports need to work 
to the shared interests of both the Secretary and the CDF. 
The newly titled Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence will 
spend at least as much time in the CDF’s office developing 
the strategic basis for operations or setting force structure 
priorities. Likewise, military folk will be talking to the 
Secretary on everything from funding issues to accessing 
enablers. The new organisational structure will work well if 
people bring a collaborative instinct to the job.
Recommendation 1.6: The strategic centre include the 
Associate Secretary and Vice Chief of the Defence Force as 
the integrators for the Defence enterprise and the future 
force and joint capabilities respectively.
In effect, the Associate Secretary and the VCDF will 
form a junior diarchy with responsibility for ‘integrating’ 
complementary halves of Defence. To some extent, they’ll 
constitute the core of a headquarters function for Defence. By 
‘integrate’ is meant ‘bring others together, make trade-offs 
and drive cooperation to create joint outputs’.
In terms of responsibilities, the Associate Secretary will 
have both a ‘headquarters’ and a ‘service delivery’ role. 
The former includes responsibility for enterprise planning, 
performance and risk management. The latter amounts to 
delivering a range of non-military enabling services. These 
will include ‘facilities and estate, security, information and 
communications technology, information management, 
human resources, legal and audit’.
The VCDF will be responsible for ‘joint force integration, 
interoperability and designing the future force’ as well as 
preparedness setting and military strategy. In addition, the 
VCDF will continue to be responsible for a range of military 
enabling services, including joint logistics, health, cadets, 
reserves and military education.
In some respects, One Defence designs itself around the 
principals—the people already in senior jobs—rather than 
the principles of key organisational priorities. This is clear 
in the recommendations dealing with top positions in the 
‘strategic centre’ of Defence. For example, the mini-diarchy 
function created between the Associate Secretary and the 
VCDF would probably be better if it were between the new 
Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence and the VCDF. The 
1997 Defence Efficiency Review’s report, Future directions for 
the management of Australia’s defence, described the role of 
the (then titled) Deputy Secretary Strategy and Intelligence 
and the VCDF as ‘the intellectual powerhouse that drives 
the coherent functioning of the whole organisation’. 
Because of the roles these two positions have in strategy 
and capability, that remains the case today. But, recognising 
the current positions, One Defence pairs the VCDF with the 
Associate Secretary, who is largely responsible for corporate 
governance and enabling areas, as the basis of the new 
mini-diarchy. Time will show whether that’s the right pairing.
Recommendation 1.7: The Vice Chief of the Defence Force’s 
decision rights be greatly strengthened, including the right 
to stop projects proceeding through the approval process 
until joint force integration is proven.
The position of the VCDF is rightly elevated, adding 
considerably to their authority for joint capability. This is 
an overdue step that Defence should have taken some time 
ago. We’ve yet to see the personnel costs associated with 
increasing the VCDF’s throw-weight, but there will be costs. 
It will take almost superhuman capacities to manage the 
position’s span of control.
The recommendation’s emphasis on joint capability 
integration is understandable, but the VCDF will have the 
power to decide which projects go forward anyway, because 
they’ll chair the Investment Committee.
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Recommendation 1.8: Legislative changes to formally 
recognise the authority of the Chief of the Defence Force 
and the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, including removing 
the statutory authority of the Service Chiefs.
This recommendation seeks to address how the Defence 
Act apportions command authority. Briefly, the issues are 
as follows.
1. Under the Defence Act, the service chiefs command 
the services and the CDF commands the service chiefs. 
Consequently, the CDF only commands the services 
through the service chiefs. When the service chiefs are 
removed from the picture, the CDF will then directly 
command services.
From the perspective of the service chiefs, there’s 
arguably more at stake. Under current legislation, they 
directly advise the minister on matters pertaining to their 
services. With this comes (or so it’s often claimed) an 
implicit ‘right of approach’, whereby they can approach 
the minister outside of the chain of command. This 
would presumably be lost under the proposed revision of 
the Act.
The 1997 report of the Defence Efficiency Review 
considered removing the statutory authorities of the 
service chiefs, saying:
The idea that the Service Chiefs (or anyone else) 
should have a formal right to bypass their superior 
officer is contrary to sound management theory and 
practice …
At that time, however, this was considered a step too 
far and no recommendation was made to change the 
Defence Act. Eighteen years later, One Defence makes 
the right call to cement the leadership authority of the 
CDF and the Secretary in relation to the service chiefs. In 
2015, the change looks more symbolic than substantive: 
it would be a strange decision for a minister not to see 
a service chief if one of them demanded a meeting, 
regardless of statutory authority. Symbols are important, 
though, and there’s bound to be some push-back, if only 
from past service chiefs.
2. The review further proposes that service chiefs ‘be 
explicitly subject to the direction of the Chief of the 
Defence Force’. The current Act says only that the 
service chiefs exercise command ‘under the Chief of the 
Defence Force’.
3. The review proposes that the VCDF’s role as deputy to the 
CDF be codified in legislation. The current Act allows the 
delegation of administration from the CDF to the VCDF 
but is silent on the delegation of command.
Recommendation 1.9: That policy advice be strengthened 
by bringing all policy functions into one organisational 
unit in order to improve the quality of advice provided 
to Government.
Defence provides policy advice to the government on 
myriad issues, from contracting to health. The consolidation 
of all such functions wouldn’t be feasible. The intent of 
the recommendation is only to consolidate core defence 
and strategic policy functions, including strategic and 
international policy. Even then, the consolidation will be 
incomplete because force structure policy will reside with the 
VCDF. Although the review doesn’t say so, the new unit will 
come under the Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence.
Recommendation 1.10: A strong and credible internal 
contestability function be built and led by the Deputy 
Secretary Policy and Intelligence with responsibility 
for strategic contestability, scope, technical and 
cost contestability.
This recommendation pertains to the capital equipment 
program. ASPI has long argued for just such an initiative, and 
it’s pleasing to see that the review agrees. Contestability in 
capability development is important to ensure that Defence 
rigorously defines the military capabilities that it needs 
based on an intelligent appreciation of Australia’s changing 
strategic outlook.
Note that the review envisages that the Deputy Secretary 
Policy and Intelligence will have a veto power over the 
progress of projects. That’s fine, but once again the logic 
of dividing accountabilities between the Secretary and the 
CDF comes under challenge. How can the CDF be solely 
accountable for force structure proposals if the Secretary 
(through their subordinate) has veto power over the 
construction of the force structure?
A key challenge for the Deputy Secretary Policy and 
Intelligence will be to manage the workload, and that can 
only be done through substantial delegation of responsibility. 
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That runs counter to the normal Defence practice, which is to 
push decision-making to higher levels. As important as the 
contestability function is, the Deputy Secretary Policy and 
Intelligence’s primary role must remain helping to deliver 
Defence outcomes, whether by providing policy advice or by 
playing a necessary role in defining military capabilities. The 
job therefore calls for a complex mix of being able to facilitate 
as well as to ‘red card’ equipment projects. Hard work, 
indeed.
Recommendation 1.11: That the policy and intelligence 
functions be combined under a Deputy Secretary Policy 
and Intelligence, who will have responsibility for providing 
policy advice and intelligence assessments to the Secretary 
and the Chief of the Defence Force.
This recommendation will see the work of two deputy 
secretaries done by one person. Given that this was the 
case not so long ago, there’s no reason why it shouldn’t 
occur. If nothing else, it will set a precedent for ‘de-layering’ 
the organisation.
The review points to the potential benefits of cooperation 
between intelligence and policy officers as a result of the 
consolidation. Provided this is done with due regard to the 
critical separation of the policy and intelligence functions 
(an issue that the review discusses at length), there could 
indeed be benefits beyond saving the taxpayer a deputy 
secretary’s salary.
The loss of the term ‘Strategy’ may have had little more 
to it than a desire to avoid an unfortunate acronym for a 
job title involving Policy, Intelligence and Strategy. But 
for an organisation uniquely concerned with the classical 
purpose of strategy—using armed force to achieve 
political objectives—losing the title is beyond regrettable. 
Strategy isn’t just about business planning; nor is most 
‘policy’ strategic.
Recommendation 1.12: The Defence Security Authority be 
repositioned under the Associate Secretary.
The Defence Security Authority is a service provider and 
therefore fits most naturally under the Associate Secretary.
Recommendation 1.13: The Defence Committee be 
re-positioned as the primary decision making committee 
of Defence and the heart of the strategic centre with two 
supporting committees—Enterprise Business Committee 
and Investment Committee.
The new committee structure appears in Figure 3 of this 
report, and the membership of the new committees appears 
in Table 4.
Just like those titans of modern music, the lamentable One 
Direction, One Defence will have its own slimmed down boys’ 
band (yes, all boys of course—for now, anyway) in the form 
of a radically reduced Defence Committee. The review team 
should be congratulated for biting the bullet and shrinking 
the Defence Committee. The exclusion of the service chiefs 
from the committee is consistent with a move from a 
federated to a centrally run enterprise.
Debate will continue about whether the right membership is 
proposed. For example, the absence of the Deputy Secretary 
Capability Acquisition and Sustainment position from the 
committee is bizarre and will surely be changed in time. On 
the other hand, the continuing presence of the Chief Finance 
Officer position is unnecessary. That role should be in the 
Associate Secretary’s domain.
The Defence Committee will focus ‘on the major capability 
and resource trade-offs and the shared accountabilities of the 
Secretary and CDF’. The Enterprise Business Committee will 
be responsible for running the Defence enterprise, including 
‘planning, performance monitoring and reporting, enterprise 
risk management, information management and service 
delivery reform’. The Investment Committee will consider 
the equipment and facilities investment programs along with 
individual projects.
Apart from the Investment Committee, which is clearly an 
advisory committee with the VCDF as sole decision-maker, 
the review is silent about how decisions will be reached. 
Presumably, the Associate Secretary is the sole 
decision-maker in the Enterprise Business Committee. But 
what about the Defence Committee?
Conspicuous by its absence is the Chiefs of Service 
Committee. It’s neither preserved nor done away with. 
Although it’s not an enterprise-wide committee, it’s normally 
been included in previous descriptions of Defence’s higher 
committee structure.
Recommendation 1.14: That all other enterprise-wide 
committees be reviewed for their relevance and alignment 
with the One Defence business model with the aim of a 
substantial reduction in the number of committees.
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There’s nothing new in this recommendation. Once again, 
Defence is being told to weed its bureaucratic garden of 
committees. And just as in a real garden, it will need to do so 
again in the not too distant future.
But while it’s fashionable to decry committees, they can serve 
a useful purpose. In a diverse organisation such as Defence, 
it’s often necessary to bring together disparate expertise to 
properly inform complex decisions.
Recommendation 1.15: That the organisational structure 
reporting to the Vice Chief of the Defence Force be 
simplified through the incorporation of a two-star Head of 
Joint Enablers role.
With the goal of lessening the workload of the VCDF, a new 
two-star position will be created to oversee the hodgepodge 
of seven disparate entities currently under the control of 
the VCDF, including various military education institutions. 
Another option might have been to assign some joint tasks to 
the Commander Joint Operational Command role, or indeed 
to a service chief to manage the task as a joint role on behalf 
of the whole Defence organisation as a net addition to their 
raise, train and sustain role. They key point is to find ways to 
make the VCDF role manageable.
Recommendation 1.16: A strengthened centre-led, 
enterprise-wide planning and performance monitoring 
process be adopted.
Recommendation 1.17: The Associate Secretary be the 
central authority to deliver enterprise planning and 
performance monitoring processes, in line with the 
requirements of the Public Governance, Performance and 
Accountability Act 2013.
These recommendations strengthen recent progress in 
Defence planning. Among other things, it’s proposed that 
the Associate Secretary will not only develop the overall 
Corporate Plan, but will also ‘challenge’ (by which is meant 
‘contest’) the resulting subsidiary planning documents from 
other parts of the organisation to ensure alignment with 
strategy and priorities. In effect, the contestability envisaged 
for the capital investment program will be extended to all 
recurrent operating activities across the organisation. This is 
an excellent idea.
There’s also a new emphasis on performance monitoring, 
which makes sense: performance management is the natural 
flip side of planning. The difficulty of this task shouldn’t 
be underestimated. Apart from a handful of quantified 
results—financial and otherwise—and the attainment of 
concrete milestones in equipment acquisition projects, 
most performance measures in Defence are qualitative and 
self-reported. The Associate Secretary will have their work 
cut out for them.
Recommendation 1.18: That the Minister for Defence meet 
with the Defence Committee twice yearly to consider a 
formal strategic assessment of the alignment between 
Defence’s strategy, funding and capability.
Ministers commission reviews, and their own roles and 
functions are seldom directly considered. It’s telling that the 
First Principles Review feels the need to urge ministers to 
meet formally with their departments. The recommendation 
makes perfect sense and points to a rather sensitive 
observation that the work practices of ministers could 
benefit from a more explicit examination. Few ministers visit 
the Russell offices. Those that do will be welcomed for their 
leadership and get a more detailed insight into the working 
of the organisation than can be conveyed by hasty and too 
frequently interrupted meetings in the ministerial wing of 
Parliament House.
The focus on alignment is appropriate. Over the years, 
strategy, funding and capability have rarely been in 
concert. For a long time, this has been because of careless 
or deliberate underestimations of costs by Defence. More 
recently, a gap emerged due to the failure of government 
to make good on funding commitments. Given this history, 
having the two parties sit down with the facts on the table 
can’t do any harm. It would make sense to invite the Minister 
for Finance to the meetings.
Recommendation 1.19: Defence conduct regular reviews of 
the capital program in consultation with the Minister and 
central agencies.
The First Principles Review wasn’t asked to review wider 
processes supporting government decision-making on 
defence. With this review completed, and with a much 
stronger costing framework in place for capability 
development, the need is to streamline the roles of other 
agencies in cabinet decision-making. One solution would be 
to trade off endless departmental wrangling over first- and 
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second-pass equipment approvals with the annual review 
proposed here.
The review also suggests that ‘a senior representative from 
the Department of Finance on the Investment Committee 
would also facilitate this engagement’. That used to be 
standard practice.
Key Recommendation 2: Establish a single end-to-end 
capability development function within the Department 
to maximise the efficient, effective and professional 
delivery of military capability.
Recommendation 2.1: Disbanding the Capability 
Development Group and dispersing its functions to more 
appropriate areas.
This is one of the most consequential and most risky of the 
One Defence recommendations. It’s consequential because, 
regardless of the organisational structure, Defence has a 
critical need for capability development. It’s risky because 
in the next few years the government will have to make two 
of the most expensive capability decisions ever—for new 
submarines and new surface ships. So those proposals will be 
developed by new entities, even as these structures are being 
set up.
Just because something is risky doesn’t mean it shouldn’t be 
attempted. Capability Development Group (CDG) got some 
unfair bad press, but it was clearly not meeting Defence’s or 
the government’s needs. Deep investment will be needed 
to upskill the capability development workforce—this is 
central to making any new structure more effective. While 
One Defence clearly identifies the new roles that the services, 
the VCDF and the Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence 
will play, it’s less clear about how equipping the VCDF and 
the Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence with all the 
red cards will help to create a ‘green for go’ ethic in the 
organisation. Remember, the aim is to deliver capability.
At present, CDG develops capability acquisition proposals 
(usually on behalf of the services) and seeks approval from 
government for acquisition to occur. Once approval is 
granted, the project is transferred to DMO for execution. 
In practice, CDG and DMO work together both before and 
after project approval. The review recommends that CDG 
be disbanded and that its core components be relocated 
as follows:
• The current (weak) contestability function and 
responsibility for seeking project approval from 
government go to the new Policy and Intelligence Group.
• The requirement development function goes to the VCDF 
(for joint proposals) and the service chiefs (for land, sea 
and air proposals).
It’s unclear where responsibility for managing the Capital 
Investment Plan will reside.
Shifting the contestability function to the new Policy and 
Intelligence Group makes sense (indeed, it reflects a return 
to pre-1997 arrangements), but the merit of dividing the 
remainder of CDG among the three services and the VCDF 
is difficult to fathom. Doing so can only make coordination, 
standardisation and staff development more difficult.
But things might not pan out as suggested by the review. 
Defence has advised ASPI that (although the report doesn’t 
say it) the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group will 
be responsible for seeking first- and second-pass approval 
under the new process. The capability managers will be 
responsible only for seeking Gate Zero approval. Moreover, 
Defence has further advised us that the reallocation of 
personnel from CDG is pending the formulation of the 
implementation plan.
The obvious inference is that many of the staff slated in the 
review to move to the VCDF and the services will instead 
move to the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group. 
Indeed, it makes good sense that the staff currently engaged 
in the specialised tasks of preparing paperwork for first- 
and second-pass in CDG will continue to do so under the 
new arrangement.
But if the core staff in CDG move to the new group, what’s 
really changed? One day, you have a group doing capability 
development; the next, you have a division within a group 
doing capability development. And although the new 
arrangement will potentially foster greater cooperation 
between the ‘proposers’ and the ‘acquirers’, the two 
groups have always worked closely during the pre- and 
post-approval phases of capability development.
Recommendation 2.2: Disbanding the Defence Materiel 
Organisation and transferring its core responsibilities 
in relation to capability delivery to a new Capability 
Acquisition and Sustainment Group.
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Creating the new Capability Acquisition and Sustainment 
Group under a deputy secretary within the structure of 
Defence’s ‘strategic centre’ is the mirror opposite of what 
was recommended in the 1997 Defence Efficiency Review. 
Eighteen years ago, the then Deputy Secretary for Acquisition 
was renamed the Chief of Defence Acquisition, given more 
autonomy and set on the path to becoming DMO. Now 
the imperative is to bring acquisition more strongly back 
into alignment.
It may be that One Defence has swung the pendulum too 
far back from the high-point of DMO’s perceived autonomy. 
The new Deputy Secretary Capability Acquisition and 
Sustainment doesn’t have a seat on the Defence Committee 
and has to report to the VCDF in the new Investment 
Committee and to the Associate Secretary in the Enterprise 
Business Committee, and to formally report quarterly and 
monthly to the Secretary to assure them that all operational 
outputs and major contracts are on track. This, the review 
says, is because ‘de-layering and greater empowerment of 
the organisation is [sic] essential for efficient operation’. More 
de-layering will be needed soon.
DMO had the clout to push back on Defence regarding the 
risk and cost estimates for projects, and it proved to be a 
formidable counterparty when dealing with defence industry. 
It remains to be seen whether those characteristics can be 
maintained under the new arrangements.
There’s more to this recommendation than the Capability 
Acquisition and Sustainment Group taking over the roles 
of DMO. The new group will also take on the supply chain 
and delivery components from Joint Logistics Command 
(a long overdue commonsense move), the non-materiel 
procurement function from the existing Defence Support and 
Reform Group (which won’t make much of a difference) and a 
yet-to-be-determined slice of CDG. Although it’s not a formal 
recommendation, the review says that Industry Division 
should be transferred to the Department of Industry. DSTO 
was to become part of the new group, but the government 
rejected that recommendation.
One thing is certain. The new Deputy Secretary Capability 
Acquisition and Sustainment will be very busy, not only 
shouldering the workload previously done by a CEO and 
four deputy secretaries in DMO, but also taking on the bulk 
of the work previously performed by CDG. To make matters 
worse, there’s the added challenge of attracting scarce talent 
with reduced salaries. The risk is that the new group will lack 
the skills and experience to negotiate effectively with their 
private sector counterparts. 
Recommendation 2.3: Developing a new organisational 
design and structure as part of the implementation process 
for the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group with 
reduced management layers.
Subsequent recommendations effectively extend 
this sensible recommendation to the remainder of 
the organisation.
Recommendation 2.4 Examining each System Program 
Office to determine where each fits within the smart buyer 
function, the most appropriate procurement model and 
achieving value for money.
DMO has progressively moved towards closer partnerships 
with industry, including through the introduction of 
performance-based contracts. At the same time, work’s 
been done on transferring a greater share of acquisition and 
sustainment management to industry. The review supports 
those initiatives and recommends the systematic rollout 
of what it terms ‘smart procurement’ approaches where 
they’re applicable. Provided this is done with care, it has the 
potential to deliver value for money and allow the size of the 
Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group to decline 
over time. The risk is that the greater commercial acumen 
of industry will see Defence locked into disadvantageous 
long-term contracts.
Recommendation 2.5 The Capability Managers specify 
the Fundamental Inputs to Capability requirements with 
the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group having 
responsibility for developing and delivering an integrated 
project plan.
The entry of new capability into service is sometimes delayed 
because the ‘fundamental inputs to capability’, such as 
personnel, training systems, facilities and sustainment 
services, aren’t ready in time to support the introduction 
of new equipment. This recommendation seeks to forestall 
that possibility by allocating responsibility for identifying 
and planning the introduction of capability into service. 
In practice, the capability managers and the Capability 
Acquisition and Sustainment Group will need to work closely 
to identify the inputs and develop the plan—even more so 
when it comes to executing the plan.
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We’ll need to see more from government about the role of 
industry as a fundamental input to capability. It may have 
been out of the review’s remit, but it hasn’t adequately 
addressed how industry needs to be more effectively 
brought into the capability development, acquisition and 
sustainment process.
Recommendation 2.6: The accountability for requirements 
setting and management be transferred to the Vice Chief 
of the Defence Force and the Service Chiefs with strategic, 
financial and technical contestability being located with 
Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence.
This recommendation reflects and reinforces 
Recommendation 2.1. In the case of requirements setting, 
it will make very little difference. The capability managers 
(that is, the service chiefs) already closely control that phase 
of projects. More generally, the recommendation highlights 
the essential collaborative nature of Defence’s business. 
The Deputy Secretary Policy and Intelligence won’t be 
able to exercise financial contestability without the closest 
cooperation of the Chief Finance Officer or to exercise 
technical contestability without the Chief Defence Scientist.
Recommendation 2.7: That the Independent Project 
Performance Office and the Capability Investment and 
Resources Division be relocated to Deputy Secretary Policy 
and Intelligence, significantly enhanced and strengthened 
to provide such contest.
This recommendation reflects and reinforces 
Recommendation 1.10.
Recommendation 2.8: Revising the Defence 
investment approval process for all large or complex 
capability projects.
The present multi-pass capability development system is 
slow and cumbersome, so it’s good that the review sensibly 
commends the current process of fast-tracking acquisitions 
where it’s sensible to do so.
The review also suggests that the approval process be 
revised to ensure that a wide range of options is considered 
initially for each proposal and to reduce unnecessary 
documentation at each stage. While those are laudable goals, 
they’ll be difficult to achieve. The strengthened prerogatives 
of the service chiefs (who usually know what they want) 
will limit rather than expand the range of options, and it’s 
always easier to add paperwork than delete it (as the next 
recommendation demonstrates).
Recommendation 2.9: Introducing a new formal gate 
into the process at entry point—Gate Zero: Investment 
Portfolio entry.
This recommendation simply formalises what used to be 
termed the ‘entry into the Defence Capability Plan’ stage 
of the capability development cycle. It makes the two-pass 
process into a three-pass process from the perspective 
of sponsors. But the discussion accompanying the 
recommendation raises worrying questions about how the 
review envisages capability planning and development.
The Defence Capability Plan is currently a 10-year plan 
(20 years in its classified form) for how the ADF will evolve. 
It’s an evolving plan that’s constantly updated as strategic, 
technical and financial future estimates change. Without 
a long-term plan, it’s impossible to balance investment 
between different capabilities over time. Every purchase 
we commit to today places limits on the options we have 
for future investment through both the direct impact of 
acquisition costs and the indirect impact of personnel and 
operating costs.
The review puts an emphasis on projects being closely 
contested before entry into the Defence Capability Plan to 
ensure that they’re ‘likely to fit with the future capability 
needs of Defence’. As far as it goes, that sounds reasonable. 
But the review then goes on to say that ‘each Capability 
Manager would need to maintain a pipeline of potential 
new capability projects which are under consideration 
(based on their view of the evolving capability needs 
within their domain) but not yet ready to enter the Defence 
Investment Plan’.
While such a piecemeal approach of adding projects ‘at the 
margin’ to the portfolio makes perfect sense if you’re running 
an investment bank or mining company, it doesn’t in the 
defence planning context. Apart from hedging risks, there are 
limited interactions in a commercial investment portfolio. 
In contrast, the interactions between the various parts of a 
military force are fundamental to its utility.
Projects should only enter the Defence Investment Plan 
through the periodic examination of the plan as a whole, 
not by having the individual services maintaining a stable of 
bright ideas ready to line up at the starting gate.
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Recommendation 2.10: Government increase approval 
thresholds for capability development projects, with 
ministerial approval required only for projects above 
$20 million, two ministers above $100 million and Cabinet 
above $250 million.
Cabinet routinely considers non-defence proposals costing 
less than $100 million. What is it about Defence that provides 
confidence that its proposals warrant less scrutiny than those 
from the Treasury, the Health Department or other parts of 
government? On past experience, the case is unpersuasive, 
but there’s a practical reality to take into account.
The Kinnaird reforms brought in a two-pass cabinet approval 
system for defence projects. In practice, many projects, 
especially larger ones, will have multiple visits to the National 
Security Committee. An elaborate whole-of-government 
structure has been built around this system, which is so 
cumbersome that it’s collapsing under its own weight. The 
review points to this in a section titled ‘The problem’:
Project approval processes are lengthy and expensive. 
The average government submission is 70 pages long, 
takes 16 weeks to move through the Cabinet preparation 
process and an average of 46 months to progress from 
first pass initiation through to second pass approval. 
(p. 14)
Anything that helps to break this gridlock is welcome. Lifting 
the dollar value of ministerial and ‘two-minister’ approvals 
will prevent Defence project minnows from cluttering up the 
cabinet agenda. Of course, ministers need to be accountable 
for their own decision-making, which needs to be rigorous, 
based on appropriate processes and publicly recorded.
Recommendation 2.11: That there be significant 
investment in the development of:
• An operational framework which briefly but 
comprehensively explains how the organisation 
operates and the roles and responsibilities within it
• A detailed set of life cycle management processes which 
provide the project and engineering discipline with 
which to manage complex materiel procurement from 
initiation to disposal
• A review architecture which reinforces accountability at 
all levels and brings together information at each level 
upon which good management decisions can be made.
The standardisation of processes and reporting makes sense.
Recommendation 2.12: The Deputy Secretary Capability 
Acquisition and Sustainment must sign off and assure 
the Secretary of the operational output of each of his/
her divisions every quarter and on major contracts on a 
monthly basis.
Okay, but why isn’t this simply part of the performance 
management regime to be managed by the 
Associate Secretary?
Recommendation 2.13: The use of net personnel operating 
costs process cease immediately.
Defence has long made use of net personnel and operating 
cost (NPOC) estimates for planning purposes. NPOC 
estimates are the estimated net additional cost (or saving) 
from the introduction of new capability into service. 
Given that most capabilities are replacements of existing 
capabilities, the notion of NPOC is very useful from a 
planning perspective.
The review takes exception to the use of NPOC. It argues 
that NPOC misleads government by failing to disclose the 
total cost of capability and is hard to estimate and often 
inaccurate. Both points are valid, but even taken together 
they’re unpersuasive.
While it’s true that NPOC is hard to estimate, it’s easier to 
estimate than the ‘total’ cost. Moreover, NPOC is clearly and 
unambiguously defined: it’s the extra cost of the proposal. 
In contrast, there’s no unambiguous or even commonsense 
way to define the total cost of an individual capability within 
the overall defence budget. Any estimate of the total cost 
depends on a complex set of attribution rules with hundreds 
of parameters to apportion the cost of common supporting 
activities (such as training, administration and so on) across 
the force structure.
It would be good to see the total cost of capabilities reported 
according to a consistent set of attribution rules, but that’s 
probably not worth the effort. Defence attempted to report 
the total cost of capabilities in the early 2000s, but the 
scheme was abandoned after volatility (due to changing 
attribution rules) rendered the numbers useless. It’s been 
tried and it failed.
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There’s a third possibility: the direct marginal cost of 
owning and operating a capability. That would be the cost 
of acquisition plus the direct cost of personnel and support 
(that is, excluding the impact on overheads and economies of 
scale). While there’s still some ambiguity about what’s direct 
or otherwise, a reasonable estimate can usually be made.
NPOC is useful and should be retained. At the same time, the 
government should also be advised of the direct marginal 
costs of future (and indeed current) defence capabilities.
Recommendation 2.14: Developing a Defence 
Investment Plan which would include all capital 
and related investments (such as materiel, estate 
and facilities, workforce and information and 
communications technology).
This was the intent of the Defence Capability Plan when 
it was first set out in the 2000 Defence White Paper. Over 
time, the extent to which non-equipment items have been 
included has varied. It’s understood that the current Defence 
Capability Plan includes NPOC estimates. Whatever can 
be done to make the plan more complete is worthwhile. 
Nonetheless, it’s unavoidable that capability proposals will 
be less well defined and less well costed in the outer years of 
the plan. The inherent ambiguity needs to be managed rather 
than wished away.
The review says that the plan should be reviewed annually. If 
that isn’t already occurring, what was routine practice only a 
few years ago must have deteriorated.
Recommendation 2.15: That, on Government approval, 
the entire project acquisition budget is allocated to the 
Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group to ensure 
expenditure is in accordance with the project delivery plan.
This recommendation follows a measured discussion 
of the use of slippage in defence planning, which the 
review endorses as a legitimate management tool. 
The recommendation refers to the practice of Defence 
withholding money from DMO in anticipation that DMO will 
underspend. To be clear, the recommendation doesn’t want 
the entire multi-year project budget to be transferred to the 
Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group at project 
approval. Rather, it wants Defence to give the group every 
opportunity to spend annual funding allocations on schedule.
Recommendation 2.16: The Defence Science and 
Technology Organisation be required to clearly articulate 
its value proposition. This would include examples and 
actual amounts of value created.
It’s not clear what’s expected from asking DSTO to mark its 
own homework. It will give itself a pass with flying colours.
Recommendation 2.17: The Defence Science and 
Technology Organisation become part of the Capability 
Acquisition and Sustainment Group.
The government has rejected this recommendation. That’s 
the right call. DSTO has played important roles in a range 
of operational activities that go well beyond capability 
development and have enhanced Defence’s safety and 
performance on combat operations. It’s important that the 
organisation retains the capacity to do that work, as well as 
to contribute to capability development.
Recommendation 2.18: The Defence Science and 
Technology Organisation senior leadership be rationalised.
DSTO has three deputy secretary level positions labelled as 
‘Deputy Chief Defence Scientist’.
Recommendation 2.19: The Defence Science and 
Technology Organisation strengthen partnerships with 
academic and research institutions to leverage knowledge 
and create pathways with academia and industry.
Recommendation 2.20: Disbanding the Defence Science 
and Technology Organisation advisory board.
While hardly critical to DSTO operations, the advisory 
board was an element of outreach to the wider research 
and industry communities. If DSTO is to make progress on 
Recommendation 2.19, it will surely need something like this 
board to facilitate stronger partnerships.
Recommendation 2.21: Defence, in partnership with 
academia and industry, review its research priorities, their 
alignment with future force requirements and capacity to 
leverage allied partners to promote innovation.
There is insufficient public information to assess the merit or 
consequences of implementing this recommendation.
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Key Recommendation 3: Fully implement an enterprise 
approach to the delivery of corporate and military 
enabling services to maximise their effectiveness 
and efficiency.
The recommendations below deal with corporate and 
military enabling services. Before the 1997 Defence Reform 
Program, many enabling services were duplicated across 
the services and other organisational units. The program 
sought to establish consolidated ‘shared service’ entities to 
provide enabling services to the organisation in functions 
such as IT services, facilities management, finance, personnel 
management, non-materiel procurement and materiel 
sustainment. The underlying goal was to improve efficiency 
by generating economies of scale and centrally rationing 
performance levels.
Although the Defence Reform Program put in place the basic 
building blocks of a shared services regime in Defence, there 
were resistance and backsliding in many areas. For example, 
the services quickly regenerated many of the personnel 
management functions that had nominally been centralised. 
It wasn’t until the 2009 Strategic Reform Program that serious 
efforts were made to complete the transition to a shared 
model for enabling services. Although encouraging progress 
has been made in many areas over the past six years, the 
task remains incomplete—in part because of resistance 
to change in some quarters. The recommendations below 
seek to complete the process and, moreover, improve the 
performance of the enabling services.
Recommendation 3.1: Defence define the estate need as 
determined by future force requirements and Government 
agree to dispose of all unnecessary estate holdings starting 
with the 17 bases identified in the 2012 Future Defence 
Estate Report.
Because the 2012 Future Defence estate report hasn’t 
been made public, it’s impossible to properly assess this 
recommendation, but some general points can be made. 
Estate consolidation works as follows. A base is closed and 
after potentially expensive remediation the property is sold 
(possibly yielding a positive cash flow). At the same time, new 
facilities are built at an existing base to house the displaced 
units (yielding a negative cash flow). In the years that follow, 
savings may accrue from the economies of scale generated at 
the consolidated site.
It’s problematic to assume that profits will automatically flow 
from sales. In some cases, the facility has heritage value or is 
difficult to sell for commercial purposes. On many Defence 
sites, sometimes dating back to World War II, industrial 
processes, the use of ammunition and practices no longer 
considered safe (such as using asbestos in construction) 
create the need for very costly remediation before the 
property can be brought to market. The result is that the 
upfront costs of selling the property can delay savings 
for Defence.
The review says (without any context or explanation) that a 
‘conservative net present value estimate of the disposal of 
these sites over 30 years is $1.4 billion, including property 
sales at a market value of $570 million, of which a bare 
minimum of $210 million would accrue in the first 10 years.’ 
So it would appear that there’s some money to be saved over 
the longer term. (Although, as an aside, it’s difficult to see 
how the net present value of savings in the past two decades 
can exceed those in the first by such a large margin, unless 
the discount rate was exceedingly small.)
Governments are often loath to consolidate Defence bases 
because of the adverse local economic and political impacts. 
Moreover, in a time of budget stringency, governments tend 
to be more focused on short-term savings than on investing 
in order to achieve long-term savings. It’s no surprise, then, 
that this recommendation was one of those only ‘agreed in 
principle’ by the government.
Unless the revenue from the sale of a base exceeds the cost 
of relocation, the government is right to be cautious. That 
the proposed sales will generate a positive net present value 
over the long term does not by itself justify the sales. If there 
are large upfront costs, base relocations should be compared 
with alternative investment options. For example, the net 
present value of a civil infrastructure project may well exceed 
that of consolidating a defence base.
Recommendation 3.2: Defence strengthen its capability 
to present options to Government for estate disposal 
including obtaining expert external advice as required.
Okay, but it may still be an uphill battle. There’s no 
getting around the fact that a base relocation can be 
economically advantageous from a national perspective but 
economically disadvantageous from a local (and therefore 
political) perspective.
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Recommendation 3.3: the Government amend the Public 
Works Act 1969 to set a $75 million threshold for referring 
proposed works to the Public Works Committee, and 
re-consider recent adjustments to the 2015–16 Budget 
operational rules that run counter to more efficiently 
managing investment spending.
The review says that the current lower thresholds delay the 
commencement of medium projects by one month and major 
projects by six months. Rather than reduce parliamentary 
scrutiny of Defence public works, delays could be avoided by 
Defence simply taking account of the approval timeframes 
and planning accordingly. Indeed, the time taken to achieve 
approval from the Public Works Committee is only a ‘delay’ 
if Defence is tardy in submitting its paperwork relative to the 
planned commencement of construction. Nonetheless, the 
current threshold of $15 million is small on the scale of public 
works projects.
Recommendation 3.4: The Associate Secretary be directed 
and resourced to implement enterprise information 
management that provides Defence with trusted 
information to inform decision-making and military 
interoperability, with the Vice Chief of the Defence Force as 
the design authority for the next generation of Command, 
Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance.
The review passes the function of being the C4ISR capability 
manager from the Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security 
to the VCDF. This may be appropriate, especially given 
the VCDF’s vastly increased authority on joint capability 
management, but it creates some new complexities. First, 
the C4ISR capability management role faces enormous 
challenges in coming years, and those challenges are 
critical to the ADF being able to operate as an integrated 
organisation. Second, there’ll be a need to ensure that the 
interests of the intelligence agencies are being adequately 
addressed—this isn’t simply about ADF warfighting 
requirements. Finally, the Deputy Secretary Policy and 
Intelligence must balance the contestability role at the same 
time as advocating for the intelligence part of the group. 
Overall, a higher priority focus on C4ISR is welcome.
Recommendation 3.5: The information management 
agenda be governed at the Band 3/3 Star level by the 
Enterprise Business Committee to set overall direction 
and priorities, including the management of trade-offs 
and conflicts.
Recommendation 3.6: Supporting the Chief Information 
Officer to meet these responsibilities by formally 
recognising the Chief Technology Officer as the technical 
authority with appropriate ‘red card’ decision rights.
Another red card, and a pattern begins to form here. 
Remember that the challenge is to create an organisation 
that works—and not just in being able to red-card each other. 
Somehow, all these red cards must assemble into a machine 
infused with a ‘green for go’ spirit.
Recommendation 3.7: Defence establish enterprise-wide 
frameworks for architecture standards and master 
data management.
Recommendation 3.8: Defence embark on a pragmatic 
implementation road map to standardise business and 
information processes and their supporting applications.
The five preceding recommendations are the latest attempt 
to impose order on the complex Defence information 
environment. Progress has been made over the years, but the 
multitude of legacy systems and the continuous emergence 
of new technologies make it a difficult and ongoing task. 
Good luck.
Recommendation 3.9: Defence ensure adequate resourcing 
and funding for information management reform is 
prioritised as part of the fully costed 2015 Defence 
White Paper.
While every effort should be made to implement this 
recommendation, rapid changes in technology and its 
potential applications will necessitate constant revision 
and updating.
Recommendation 3.10: Geospatial information functions 
be consolidated into the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence 
Organisation following improved resourcing 
and connectivity.
This move is overdue and a critical element in strengthening 
Defence’s commitment to enabling technologies, without 
which many new equipment acquisitions will not work to 
their full potential.
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Recommendation 3.11: The service delivery reform 
program, including full integration of the current Defence 
Materiel Organisation corporate functions, be completed.
There are unavoidable trade-offs between centralised and 
decentralised service delivery. The former yields cost savings, 
while the latter guarantees responsiveness and clearer 
accountability. Swings and roundabouts. But the decision 
has been made (some 18 years ago) in favour of centralised 
delivery—it’s time to complete the task.
Recommendation 3.12: All corporate services (with the 
exception of finance but including the Defence Security 
Authority) be consolidated under the Associate Secretary.
This makes sense.
Recommendation 3.13: All military enabling services 
(Joint Logistics Command Policy, Joint Health Command, 
Australian Defence College, Australian Civil-Military Centre) 
be consolidated under a Two-Star officer who reports to the 
Vice Chief of the Defence Force.
This duplicates Recommendation 1.15.
Key Recommendation 4: Ensure committed people with 
the right skills are in appropriate jobs to create the One 
Defence workforce.
Recommendation 4.1: That as part of the budget and 
planning process, Defence build a strategic workforce 
plan for the enabling functions, and incorporate 
workforce plans for each job family in order to drive 
recruitment, learning and development, performance and 
talent management.
Compared to the services, where workforce planning is 
comprehensive, Defence does far less to manage its civilian 
workforce employed in enabling functions. The review makes 
a persuasive case that a strategic workforce plan is needed in 
those areas.
Delivering a professional civilian workforce for Defence will 
require deep investment in training to increase the skill levels 
of people. One can only agree with the review’s harsh but 
accurate judgement that that there are ‘low engagement 
levels amongst employees’ in Defence. Much of this 
disengagement comes from a pervasive cynicism that the 
organisation ‘talks the talk but doesn’t walk the walk’ when it 
comes to valuing civilian employees. Initiative is discouraged; 
training is ad hoc and much of what’s available is inadequate; 
management decisions affecting staff can seem arbitrary; 
and, as the review notes, the system discourages effective 
performance management. One Defence concludes that ‘we 
view this as a failing of leadership and management’, so much 
so that external assistance is needed to catalyse change ‘and 
set it on the right path’.
The good news for Defence is that prompt attention to 
making these changes happen will go a long way towards 
improving morale and building support for broader reform. 
In fact, the improvements to workforce management in One 
Defence are the changes most needed to develop behaviours 
and values supporting large-scale change.
Recommendation 4.2: Defence employ Australian Defence 
Force personnel in non-Service roles only when it is critical 
to achieving capability and for a minimum of three years to 
achieve best value-for-money from the premium paid.
Recommendation 4.3: As many functions as possible be 
performed by public servants or outsourced if they are 
transactional in nature.
Recommendation 4.2 refers to the 4,300 ADF personnel 
posted to non-service groups (at an additional cost of around 
$300 million per year compared with civilian employees), 
and Recommendation 4.3 refers to the 12,800 ADF personnel 
delivering corporate functions within the services. The latter 
group includes personnel working in logistics, legal affairs, 
human resources, finance and administration.
As a general proposition, it makes sense to use civilians 
in place of military personnel where no adverse impact 
on capability arises, and some effort has been made to 
do so. Under the 2009 Strategic Reform Program, around 
1,100 military positions were slated for ‘civilianisation’. The 
extent to which that occurred is hard to gauge, given the 
rubbery figures involved in the program.
While there’s a sensible cost-based rationale for minimising 
the use of ADF personnel in non-service roles, that change 
must be implemented carefully. Defence has gone a very 
long way to remove the deep divides that occurred between 
civilian and military personnel as late as the 1980s. Of 
course there have been exceptions, but for the most part the 
organisation works well as a workforce blending civilians 
and military people. Defence personnel have important 
roles to play in intelligence, international policy and strategy 
functions and many other areas. An ADF presence is needed 
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to lend an essential defence character to the purpose and 
intent of the organisation. Civilians serve equally important 
roles in predominantly military parts of the organisation. As 
one recruiting slogan puts it, ‘the team works.’ It would be a 
dire mistake to allow the separation of civilian and military 
workforces to proceed to the point that old suspicions 
arise again.
Recommendation 4.4: Defence review the entirety of its 
enabling and military corporate workforce to ensure that it 
supports the Australian Defence Force with the minimum 
of overlap and redundancy, and with the greatest overall 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness.
This recommendation refers to the use of ADF personnel in 
enabling groups and service corporate functions, as well 
as the duplication of roles (civilian and military) nominally 
provided by enabling groups under the shared service model.
It will be interesting to see how the proposed review is 
undertaken. To be effective, it will need to be taken out of the 
hands of the military (that have no incentive to reduce their 
own numbers). Given the role of the Associate Secretary in 
contesting group and service plans, it naturally falls to them. 
Some historical context may be useful. Back in the 1990s, 
as an adjunct to the Commercial Support Program (that is, 
outsourcing), the ‘members required in uniform’ process was 
established to systematically test the need to retain service 
personnel in non-combat roles. From memory, the process 
was neither speedy nor smooth, as the services fought to 
retain as many people in uniform as possible.
Recommendation 4.5: Defence reduce organisational 
layers; increase the spans of control of managers; align 
workforce standards in accord with the requirements of the 
Australian Public Service Commission; and engage external 
assistance to facilitate this work as required.
ASPI has long argued for this. In fact, the table presented 
by the review to demonstrate the rise in management 
numbers (Annex D in One Defence) closely resembles analysis 
presented in the annual ASPI Budget brief for some years.
However, while the review has recognised the need to 
review the enabling and corporate service workforce 
(Recommendation 4.4), it hasn’t done so in this instance. 
Perhaps that’s because there’s a more expedient solution: 
impose structural constraints on group managers; that is, set 
benchmarks for spans of control and the number of layers 
within groups.
As a start, the review has advised the Secretary and the 
CDF that seven SES Band 3 and one 3-star position should 
be disestablished. It further expects that ‘organisational 
restructuring will cascade throughout the senior leadership 
group and will necessarily change the shape and reduce the 
numbers of the leadership group.’
We can only hope that this recommendation is applied 
to the military as well as the civilian components of 
the organisation.
Recommendation 4.6: Defence implement a transparent 
performance management system that is consistently 
applied, recognises and rewards high performance and 
introduces consequences for underperformance and failure 
to deal with it.
The discussion accompanying this recommendation is 
interesting. The review found that ‘Defence has a sound 
performance management tool at its disposal, but is 
not using it effectively.’ At the risk of oversimplification, 
underperformance isn’t being managed. And, although pay 
increments are contingent on satisfactory performance, 
almost everybody is rated as at least satisfactory, thereby 
blunting incentives and removing sanctions.
The review notes, correctly, that this reflects a ‘failing 
of leadership and management’ and suggests a range 
of measures, including 360-degree appraisal and ‘real 
consequences for poor performance generally and not 
dealing with underperformance’. So far, so good, but the 
critical suggestion is that the performance appraisal system 
should be ‘transparent and applied consistently with normal 
distribution techniques being incorporated’ [our italics].
If performance appraisals (and therefore pay increments) 
were constrained to a normal distribution, there would 
be a clear and consequential link between performance 
and pay. As worthwhile as this would be, it will require 
deft negotiating in the next round of civilian and military 
workplace agreements.
Recommendation 4.7: As part of the performance 
management system, Defence take steps to create a 
culture where leadership, professionalism and corporate 
behaviour are valued and rewarded.
This is a good idea.
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Key Recommendation 5: Manage staff resources to 
deliver optimal use of funds and maximise efficiencies.
Recommendation 5.1: The use of the measures such 
as the teeth-to-tail ratio and the one third budget split 
should cease.
It certainly should. The review argues clearly why each of 
these measures is flawed. While it would be possible to 
hammer more nails into their coffins by raising still further 
objections, little would be gained. May they rest in peace.
Recommendation 5.2: Appropriate efficiency measures are 
developed which link to the delivery of agreed outcomes.
Okay, but the difficulty of doing so shouldn’t be 
underestimated. Even temporal changes in costs can be 
difficult to disentangle from broader economic factors, 
and international comparisons are particularly fraught. To 
build useful efficiency measures, Defence will need some 
combination of external assistance and an in-house capacity 
for economic analysis.
Recommendation 5.3: The focus on public service 
reductions as the primary efficiency mechanism for 
Defence cease.
Yes. Efficiency means finding the optimal mix of labour 
(civilian and military), capital (equipment and facilities) and 
purchased goods and services. There’s no reason to presume 
that the optimal mix coincides with a minimisation of civilian 
personnel numbers. It can only be hoped that One Defence 
will encourage a move away from the formulation: ‘military 
good, civilians bad’, which would so easily fit into a George 
Orwell novel and has done so much damage to workforce 
morale in the past decade.
Recommendation 5.4: Defence manage its workforce 
numbers in line with good resource management practice 
where Defence is held to account for delivering on required 
outcomes within available resourcing.
Precisely. Arbitrarily fixing the quantum of labour input 
almost guarantees less than optimal efficiency.
Recommendation 5.5: As part of the implementation 
process, Defence examine the headquarters functions 
for opportunities to achieve more effective and 
efficient arrangements.
The review identified a number of personnel reductions, 
including:
• seven Band 3 SES and one 2-star position (with ensuing 
flow-on consequences)
• 1,000 Australian Public Service (APS) and 950 ADF 
personnel from the creation of the Capability Acquisition 
and Sustainment Group (note that this shouldn’t be 
viewed as a saving because in most cases it will cost 
money to have the private sector take up the work 
previously done in-house)
• 650 APS and 100 ADF personnel from reducing the 
number of management layers.
While the APS positions refer to reductions, the review 
talks about the unneeded ADF positions as available for 
reallocation. Why it assumes that long-established service 
positions in DMO are needed elsewhere in the organisation 
is unclear. This appears to be the observed error of assuming 
that fewer civilians is always a good thing and fewer military 
personnel is always a bad thing.
This recommendation reflects the review’s inability 
to form a view about possible savings from the new 
headquarters arrangement.
Key Recommendation 6: Commence implementation 
immediately with the changes required to deliver One 
Defence in place within two years.
Recommendation 6.1: No additional reviews on the 
organisational issues covered by this Review are 
imposed on Defence, particularly within the early years 
of implementation.
One Defence ends by circling back to echo 
Recommendation 1.1; to paraphrase, ‘Let this review be the 
guiding light, and let no others compete with it for Defence 
priority.’ This is wise advice, but unlikely to stay current for 
long because of the shortness of Australia’s parliamentary 
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terms and the inevitable movement of senior figures. The 
very factors that gave rise to this review—a pre-election 
commitment by the then Opposition—will come into play 
again at some point. There’s also the risk that bad news 
will be greeted by a resort to further reviews. Few people 
would have thought that Private Jake Kovko’s sad end in 
Iraq in 2006 would lead to the 2007 Proust review of (civilian) 
defence management. The wheel keeps turning, and that 
means the best hope for One Defence is an accelerated 
implementation plan.
Recommendation 6.2: Past reviews and current reform 
initiatives should be assessed for currency and alignment 
to the One Defence model.
Clearly, the First Principles Review has reset the clock on 
Defence reform and should take precedence. Nonetheless, 
the review sensibly notes that the Pathway to Change 
initiative should continue unimpeded.
Recommendation 6.3: Establishing an Oversight Board to 
provide close external scrutiny, advice on implementation 
progress and regular reports to the Minister.
The review has created a high-level implementation plan 
with milestones for all areas, extending out to two years. In 
addition, it has outlined the governance arrangements for 
implementation. It makes sense for the review team to stick 
around and oversee the process.
Recommendation 6.4: the Minister, with input from the 
Department and the Oversight Board, report progress on 
implementation to the Government in March 2016 and 
March 2017.
Recommendation 6.5: Stability in the key leadership 
positions, particularly over the next two years to provide 
consistency of direction and ownership of the change.
Two years, of course, takes the implementation beyond the 
maximum life of the current Parliament. While the principle is 
sound, continuity of positions is not within any government’s 
gift. The only basis for One Defence to have an impact is the 
hope that its recommendations are sound and will continue 
to appeal to subsequent generations of political, military and 
civilian leaders.
Annex A: The First Principles Review—
terms of reference
1.  Ensure that the Department of Defence’s business 
structures support the ADF’s principal tasks, as 
determined by the 2015 Defence White Paper, and other 
whole of government responsibilities out to 2030;
2.  ensure a commercially astute, focused and accountable 
materiel acquisition and sustainment capability;
3. improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Defence;
4.  guide the implementation of recommendations from the 
Commission of Audit not otherwise covered above; and,
5.  ensure the ongoing delivery and reporting of 
agreed recommendations.
Issues for consideration
In addition to any issues the review team considers important 
to examine in addressing the Terms of Reference, the Review 
team should also consider the following matters:
1.  Ensure that the Department of Defence’s business 
structures support the ADF’s principal tasks, as 
determined by the 2015 Defence White Paper, and 
other whole of government responsibilities out to 2030, 
including by:
a.  Reviewing the cost, efficiency, timeliness and 
appropriateness of Defence’s current business model 
and processes, including compliance with external 
processes and responsiveness to Government, with an 
aim to simplify and improve accountability;
b.  Reviewing the capacity of Defence to develop 
strategy and key policy options, particularly, future 
White Papers, Force Structure and prioritisation of 
capability investment;
c.  Examining the efficient arrangements of the 
intelligence functions, particularly those involving 
geospatial intelligence; and
d.  Examining the functioning of the separate and shared 
responsibilities and accountabilities of the Secretary 
and Chief of Defence Force.
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2.  Ensure a commercially astute and focused materiel 
acquisition and sustainment capability, including by:
a.  Examining the benefits and costs of the following 
three approaches to reforming the Defence Materiel 
Organisation (DMO) and recommending a preferred 
option and how it should be implemented:
i.  Current model with improvements 
to commercial skills and improved 
arrangements to manage larger and more 
complex projects;
ii.  DMO to be re-integrated into Defence 
with a focus on contract management, as 
recommended by the Commission of Audit; 
and
iii.  An independent and commercialised DMO in 
whole or in part.
b.  Either as part of 2a, or separately, undertake an 
examination of specific initiatives to improve 
business processes including, but not limited, to 
the following:
i.  Options to further improve the professional 
knowledge and skills within the capability 
development function, particularly 
program and project management, 
systems engineering and cost and schedule 
estimation (particularly at DCP entry);
ii.  Options to provide greater assurance to 
Government on the capital and sustainment 
costs and schedule of large complex 
capabilities including utilising relevant 
private sector experience;
iii.  Options to significantly accelerate the 
capability development process, including 
examination of whole of government issues 
and risk based approaches;
iv.  How Defence sustains and supports 
capabilities and extending lessons from the 
Coles review across all areas of sustainment;
v.  Options for improved project control 
particularly through the mandatory use of 
Earned Value Management for all elements 
of projects that meet an appropriate 
threshold; and
vi.  Opportunities for improved certainty in 
program-level cash flow estimation, project 
and program level funding arrangements 
for DMO and alternatives to the use of 
over-programming as a management tool in 
the DCP.
3.  Recommend further options to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of Defence by:
a.  Assisting Defence to develop appropriate 
implementation plans, including appropriate benefits 
realisation plans, to deliver agreed outcomes of the 
Commission of Audit and the First Principles Review, 
to be followed by a progress review in March 2016 to 
measure the effectiveness of the implementation of 
the recommendations;
b.  Developing recommendations for the further 
rationalisation of IT systems, particularly financial and 
personnel, and further clarify accountability for them 
and their cost effectiveness;
c.  Examine and recommend options for reaching and 
maintaining a sustainable balance between Defence’s 
personnel, operating and capability budgets;
d.  In the above context, specifically consider what can be 
done about rising personnel costs, particularly for the 
ADF, that are putting the capital investment budget 
under significant pressure;
e.  Examine outstanding recommendations from other 
reviews and make recommendations on whether they 
might be retired or re-invigorated; and
f.  Recommend further options for the enhanced 
commercialization of Defence functions, including 
DSTO but excluding DHA.
4.  Recommendations from the Commission of Audit not 
otherwise covered above.
35One Defence: one direction? The First Principles Review of Defence
Acronyms and abbreviations
ADF Australian Defence Force
APS Australian Public Service
C4ISR command, control, communications, computers,  
 intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
CDF Chief of the Defence Force
CDG Capability Development Group
DMO Defence Materiel Organisation
DSTO Defence Science and Technology Organisation
FDA Force Development and Analysis
NPOC net personnel and operating cost
RAN Royal Australian Navy
VCDF Vice Chief of the Defence Force
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